Chapter 18.—It is Never
Allowable to Tell a Lie; But Lies Differ Very Much in Guilt,
According to the Intention and the Subject.
But here arises a very difficult
and very intricate question, about which I once wrote a large book,
finding it necessary to give it an answer. The question is this:
whether at any time it can become the duty of a good man to tell a
lie? For some go so far as to contend that there are occasions on
which it is a good and pious work to commit perjury even, and to
say what is false about matters that relate to the worship of God,
and about the very nature of God Himself. To me, however, it seems
certain that every lie is a sin, though it makes a great difference
with what intention and on what subject one lies. For the sin of
the man who tells a lie to help another is not so heinous as that
of the man who tells a lie to injure another; and the man who by
his lying puts a traveller on the wrong road, does not do so much
harm as the man who by false or misleading representations distorts
the whole course of a life. No one, of course, is to be condemned
as a liar who says what is false, believing it to be true, because
such an one does not consciously deceive, but rather is himself
deceived. And, on the same principle, a man is not to be accused of
lying, though he may sometimes be open to the charge of rashness,
if through carelessness he takes up what is false and holds it as
true; but, on the other hand, the man who says what is true,
believing it to be false, is, so far as his own consciousness is
concerned, a liar. For in saying what he does not believe, he says
what to his own conscience is false, even though it should in fact
be true; nor is the man in any sense free from lying who with his
mouth speaks the truth without knowing it, but in his heart wills
to tell a lie. And, therefore, not looking at the matter spoken of,
but solely at the intention of the speaker, the man who unwittingly
says what is false, thinking all the time that it is true, is a
better man than the one who unwittingly says what is true, but in
his conscience intends to deceive. For the former does not think
one thing and say another; but the latter, though his statements
may be true in fact, has one thought in his heart and another on
his lips: and that is the very essence of lying. But when we come
to consider truth and falsehood in respect to the subjects spoken
of, the point on which one deceives or is deceived becomes a matter
of the utmost importance. For although, as far as a man’s own
conscience is concerned, it is a greater evil to deceive than to be
deceived, nevertheless it is a far less evil to tell a lie in
regard to matters that do not relate to religion, than to be led
into error in regard to matters the knowledge and belief of which
are essential to the right worship of God. To illustrate this by
example: suppose that one man should say of some one who is dead
that he is still alive, knowing this to be untrue; and that another
man should, being deceived, believe that Christ shall at the end of
some time (make the time as long as you please) die; would it not
be incomparably better to lie like the former, than to be deceived
like the latter? and would it not be a much less evil to lead some
man into the former error, than to be led by any man into the
latter?