either in the order of time, or nature; it implies that gross contradiction, that the first free
act belonging to the affair, is determined by a free act which is before it. Or if they say, that
the free acts of the Will are determined by some other act of the soul, and not an act of Will
or choice; this also destroys their notion of liberty consisting in the acts of the Will being
determined by the Will itself; or if they hold that the acts of the Will are determined by
nothing at all that is prior to them, but that they are contingent in that sense, that they are
determined and fixed by no cause at all; this also destroys their notion of liberty, consisting
in the Will determining its own acts.
This being the true state of the Arminian notion of liberty, the writers who defend it
are forced into gross inconsistences, in what they say upon this subject. To instance in Dr.
Whitby; he, in his discourse on the freedom of the Will, 110 opposes the opinion of the
Calvinists, who place man’s liberty only in a power of doing what he will, as that wherein
they plainly agree with Mr. Hobbes. And yet he himself mentions the very same notion of
liberty, as the dictate of the sense and common reason of mankind, and a rule laid down by
the light of nature; viz. that liberty is a power of acting from ourselves, or doing what we will.
111 This is indeed, as he says, a thing agreeable to the sense and common reason of mankind;
and therefore it is not so much to be wondered at, that he unawares acknowledges it against
himself: for if liberty does not consist in this, what else can be devised that it should consist
in? If it be said, as Dr. Whitby elsewhere insists, that it does not only consist in liberty of
doing what we will, but also a liberty of willing without necessity; still the question returns,
what does that liberty of willing without necessity consist in, but in a power of willing as we
please, without being impeded by a contrary necessity? or in other words, a liberty for the
soul in its willing to act according to its own choice? Yea, this very thing the same author
seems to allow, and suppose again and again, in the use he makes of sayings of the fathers,
whom he quotes as his vouchers. Thus he cites the words of Origen, which he produces as
a testimony on his side; 112 “The soul acts by her own choice , and it is free for her to incline
to whatever part she will.” And those of Justin Martyr; 113 “The doctrine of the Christians
is this, that nothing is done or suffered according to fate, but that every man doth good or
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evil according to his own free choice. And from Eusebius, these words; 114 “If fate be estab-
lished, philosophy and piety are overthrown.—All these things depending upon the necessity
introduced by the stars, aloud not upon meditation and exercise proceeding from our own
free choice. And again, the words of Maccarius; 115 “God, to preserve the liberty of man’s
110 In his Book on the five Points, Second Edit. P. 350,351, 358.
111 Ibid. p. 325, 326.
112 Ibid. p. 342.
113 Ibid. p 360.
114 In his Book on the five Points, Second Edit. P. 363
115 Ibid. p. 369, 370.
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SECTION V. Showing, that if the things asserted in these Evasions should…