For, is not choosing as he pleases, conducting himself, in some respect, according to his
pleasure, and still without determining how he came by that pleasure? If he says, “Yes, I
came by that pleasure by my own choice.” If he be a man of common sense, by this time he
will see his own absurdity: for he must needs see that his notion or conception, even of this
liberty, does not contain any judgment or conception how he comes by that choice, which
first determines his pleasure, or which originally fixed his own Will respecting the affair.
Or if any shall say, “That a man exercises liberty in this, even in determining his own choice,
but not as he pleases, or not in consequence of any choice, preference, or inclination of his
own, but by a determination arising contingently out of a state of absolute indifference;”
this is not rising higher in his conception of liberty: as such a determination of the Will
would not be a voluntary determination of it. Surely he that places liberty in a power of
doing something not according to his own choice, or from his choice, has not a higher notion
of it, than he that places it in doing as he pleases, or acting from his own election. If there
were a power in the mind to determine itself, but not by its choice or according to its
pleasure, what advantage would it give? and what liberty, worth contending for, would be
exercised in it? Therefore no Arminian, Pelagian, or Epicurean, can rise higher in his con-
ceptions of liberty, than the notion of it which I have explained: which notion is perfectly
consistent with the whole of that necessity of men’s actions, which I suppose takes place.
And I scruple not to say, it is beyond all their wits to invent a higher notion, or form a
higher imagination of liberty; let them talk of sovereignty of the Will, self-determining
power, self-motion, self-direction, arbitrary decision, liberty ad utrumvis, power of choosing
differently in given cases, &c. &c. as long as they will. It is apparent that these men, in their
strenuous dispute about these things, aim at they know not what, fighting for something
they have no conception of, substituting a number of confused unmeaning words, instead
of things, and instead of thoughts. They may be challenged clearly to explain what they
would have; but they never can answer the challenge.
The author of the Essays, through his whole Essay on Liberty and Necessity, goes on
the supposition, that, in order to the being of real liberty, a man must have a freedom that
is opposed to moral necessity: and yet he supposes, (p. 175.) that “such a liberty must signify
a power in the mind of acting without and against motives, a power of acting without any
view, purpose, or design, and even of acting in contradiction to our own desires and aversions,
and to all our principles of action; and is an absurdity altogether inconsistent with a rational
nature.” Now, who ever imagined such a liberty as this, a higher sort or degree of freedom,
than a liberty of following one’s own views and purposes, and acting agreeably to his own
inclinations and passions! Who will ever reasonably suppose, that a liberty which is an ab-
surdity altogether inconsistent with a rational nature, is above that which is consistent with
the nature of a rational, intelligent, designing agent.
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SECTION XV. Containing Remarks on the Essays on the Principles of Morality…