any way exerting his faculties—then he was expected immediately to exercise love to God.
For how could it be expected, that Adam should have a strict and perfect regard to God’s
commands and authority, and his duty to him, when he had no love nor regard to him in
his heart, nor could it be expected he should have any? If Adam from the beginning did his
duty to God, and had more respect to the will of his Creator, than to other things, and as
much respect to him as he ought to have; then from the beginning he had a supreme and
perfect respect and love to God: and if so, he was created with such a principle. There is no
avoiding the consequence. Not only external duties, but internal ones, such as summarily
consist in love, must be immediately required of Adam, as soon as he existed, if any duty at
all was required. For it is most apparently absurd, to talk of a spiritual being, with the faculties
of understanding and will, being required to perform external duties, without internal. Dr.
T. himself observes, that love is the fulfilling of the law, and that all moral rectitude, even
every part of it, must be resolved into that single principle. Therefore, if any morally right act
at all, reflection, consideration, or any thing else, was required of Adam immediately, on
his first existence, and was performed as required; then he must, the first moment of his
existence, have his heart possessed of that principle of divine love; which implies the whole
of moral rectitude in every part of it, according to our author’s own doctrine; and so the
whole of moral rectitude or righteousness must begin with his existence: which is the thing
taught in the doctrine of original righteousness.
Let us consider how it could be otherwise, than that Adam was always, in every moment
of his existence, obliged to exercise such respect of heart towards every object, as was
agreeable to the apparent merit of that object. For instance, would it not at any time have
become Adam, on the exhibition of God’s infinite goodness to him, to have exercised an-
swerable gratitude; and would not the contrary have been unbecoming and odious? And if
something had been presented to Adam’s view, transcendently amiable in itself, for instance,
the glorious perfection of the divine nature, would it not have become him to love, relish,
and delight in it? Would not such an object have merited this? And if the view of an object
so amiable in itself did not affect his mind with complacence, would it not, according to the
plain dictates of our understanding, have shown an unbecoming temper of mind? Time, by
culture, to form and establish a good disposition, would not have taken off the odiousness
of the temper. And if there had been never so much time, I do not see how it could be expec-
ted he should improve it aright, in order to obtain a good disposition, if he had not already
some good disposition to engage him to it.
That belonging to the will, and disposition of the heart, which is in itself either odious
or amiable, unbecoming or decent, always would have been Adam’s virtue or sin, in any
moment of his existence; if there be any such thing as virtue or vice; by which terms nothing
can be meant, but something in our moral disposition and behaviour, which is becoming
or unbecoming, amiable or odious.
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SECTION I. Concerning Adam's original righteousness.