no effect without a cause; therefore this failure must have a cause; and this cause (not the abuse of liberty) must
bring us to the origin of moral evil. 10. What Dr. Clarke has left untouched may yet be ascertained. We think it
has been fairly excluded, by what has been already advanced, from every thing except liberty and passive power.
Therefore, the abuse of liberty can arise only from its associate. But how can this operate as a cause of the abuse
of liberty? In order to answer this question, we must recollect what liberty itself is, viz. a natural power, or in-
strument of the mind, capable of producing moral effects. Not a self-determining power, which would be contrary
to the first axiom; and which our author has abundantly demonstrated to be full of contradictions, and an utter
impossibility. It must, then, be determined by motives. But motives, as before shown, (in a former note,) are
the objects of choice in union with the state of the mind, as a compound effect. Now the cause why the real good,
suppose the chief good, which is absolutely unchangeable, is not chosen, and an inferior good appears at the
instant of choice preferable, and is in fact preferred, must arise from that part of the motive which is the state
of the mind. 11. Now there an only two states of the mind conceivable whereby liberty can be influenced; the
one, a state naturally evil; the other, a state morally good. Were we to say, that the state was morally evil, at the
first entrance of sin, we should contradict the third axiom. And were we to say, that the cause was only naturally
good, we should contradict the first axiom. Therefore the cause of the abuse of liberty, is a state naturally evil.
No other cause can possibly be assigned, without involving a contradiction. Bat what is a state naturally evil,
and without any mixture of moral evil? It can be no other but a state under the influence of what we call passive
power. 12. Let us view the subject in another light. Perfect liberty, in reference to virtue and vice, the scale of
merit and demerit, and its attendant degrees of happiness or misery, is a medium, standing between all ex-
tremes—between virtue and vice, merit and demerit, happiness and misery. If we regard divine rectitude or
equity, according to a former simile, in reference to the moral system, as an universal plane, liberty may be said
to coincide with it. And being a natural perfection, or. when exerted, a good which has a positive cause, it is the
effect of benevolent energy. If the mind be under unmerited, sovereign, benevolent influence, its liberty attaches
itself to real good; then the agent rises on the scale of excellence, and therefore of happiness. But if the mind be
under passive influence, or the influence of passive power, (a depraved nature and confirmed vicious habits
being now out of the question,) its liberty attaches itself to apparent good, in opposition to real; then vice is
generated, the agent sinks on the scale of deterioration, and consequently of misery. 13. It appears, then, that
the will, in the exercise of its freedom, when producing moral effects, is the instrument of the disposition; and
that the character of the effect bears an infallible and exact proportion to that of the predisposing cause. Yet the
will in the exercise of choice is so free, that all constraint, coaction, and impulse, are entirely excluded from that
which constitutes the morality of the act. Here lies the essence of moral agency, and the ground of accountableness.
The agent has a moral alternative; IF he be different minded may choose otherwise than he actually does if under
benevolent influence, he will, in proportion, infallibly choose aright; if under equitable, passive influence, the
apparent good will not be the real one, and consequently the choice will be morally bad. Means, objects perfectly
suitable and sufficient, are exhibited to view; but these of themselves would never determine the will, otherwise
the same effect would always follow the same means. Temptations also are presented; these in like manner of
themselves never determine the will, otherwise temptation and sin would be infallibly connected. Then the holy
Jesus could not have withstood the numerous and powerful solicitations of the tempter. But why did he withstand
all? Because objects of temptation did not constitute the whole of motives; because objects operate according
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SECTION X. Concerning sin's first Entrance into the world.