that of itself produces effects, without previously being acted upon; for that Being that lays
an arrest on bodies in motion, and immediately stops them when they come to such limits
and bounds, certainly does as much, as that Being that sets a body in motion, that before
was at rest. Now this Being, acting altogether of itself, producing new effects, that are perfectly
arbitrary, and that are no way necessary of themselves; must be Intelligent and Voluntary.
There is no reason, in the nature of the thing itself, why a body, when set in motion, should
stop at such limits, more than at any other. It must therefore be some arbitrary, active, and
voluntary Being, that determines it. If there were but one body in the Universe, that always
in time past had been at rest, and should now, without any alteration, be set i motion; we
might certainly conclude, that some voluntary Being set it in motion, because it can certainly
be demonstrated, that it can be for no other reason. So with just the same reason, in the
same manner, we may conclude, if the body had hitherto been in motion, and is at a certain
point of space now stopped. And would it not be every whit as reasonable to conclude, it
must be from such an Agent, as if, in certain portions of space, we observed bodies to be
attracted a certain way, and so at once to be set into motion, or accelerated in motion. And
it is not at all the less remarkable, because we receive the ideas of light and colours from
those spaces; for we know that light and colours are not there, and are made entirely by such
a resistance, together with attraction, that is antecedent to these qualities, and would be a
necessary effect of a mere resistance of space without other substance.
The whole of what we any way observe, whereby we get the idea of Solidity, or Solid
Body, are certain parts of Space, from whence we receive the ideas of light and colours; and
certain sensations by the sense of feeling; and we observe that the places, whence we receive
these sensations, are not constantly the same, but are successively different and this light
and colours are communicated from one part of space to another. And we observe that these
parts of Space, from whence we receive these sensations, resist and stop other bodies, which
we observe communicated successively through the parts of Space adjacent; and that those
that there were before at rest, or existing constantly in one and the same part of Space, after
this exist successively in different parts of Space, and these observations are according to
certain stated rules. I appeal to any one that takes notice and asks himself, whether his be
not all that ever be experienced in the world, whereby he got these ideas; and that this is all
that we have or can have any idea of, in relation to bodies. All that we observe of Solidity
is, that certain parts of Space, from whence we receive the ideas of light and colours, and a
few other sensations, do likewise resist any thing coming within them. It therefore follows,
that if we suppose there be any thing else, than what we thus observe, it is but only by way
of Inference.
I know that it is nothing but the Imagination will oppose me in this: I will therefore
endeavour to help the Imagination thus. Suppose that we receive none of the sensible qual-
ities of light, colours, &c. from the resisting parts of Space, (we will suppose it possible for
475
NO.IV. Remarks in Mental Philosophy. The Mind.