§33. He declares falsely that ‘the manner of the generation is to be known from the intrinsic
worth of the generator’.
He goes back, for instance, to the begetting being, and from thence takes a survey of the
begotten; “for,” says he, “the manner of the generation is to be known from the intrinsic
worth of the generator.” Again, we find this bold unqualified generalization of his causing
the thought of the inquirer to be dissipated in every possible direction; it is the nature of
such general statements, to extend in their meanings to every instance, and allow nothing
to escape their sweeping assertion. If then ‘the manner of the generation is to be known
from the intrinsic worth of the generator,’ and there are many differences in the worth of
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generators according to their many classifications167 to be found (for one may be born Jew,
Greek, barbarian, Scythian, bond, free), what will be the result? Why, that we must expect
to find as many “manners of generation” as there are differences in intrinsic worth amongst
the generators; and that their birth will not be fulfilled with all in the same way, but that
their nature will vary with the worth of the parent, and that some peculiar manner of birth
will be struck out for each, according to these varying estimations. For a certain inalienable
worth is to be observed in the individual parent; the distinction, that is, of being better or
worse off according as there has fallen to each race, estimation, religion, nationality, power,
servitude, wealth, poverty, independence, dependence, or whatever else constitutes the life-
long differences of worth. If then “the manner of the generation” is shown by the intrinsic
worth of the parent, and there are many differences in worth, we shall inevitably find, if we
follow this opinion-monger, that the manners of generation are various too; in fact, this
difference of worth will dictate to Nature the manner of the birth.
But if he should not168 admit that such worth is natural, because they can be put in
thought outside the nature of their subject, we will not oppose him. But at all events he will
agree to this; that man’s existence is separated by an intrinsic character from that of brutes.
Yet the manner of birth in these two cases presents no variation in intrinsic character; nature
brings man and the brute into the world in just the same way, i.e. by generation. But if he
apprehends this native dignity only in the case of the most proper and supreme existence,
let us see what he means then. In our view, the ‘native dignity’ of God consists in godhead
itself, wisdom, power, goodness, judgment, justice, strength, mercy, truth, creativeness,
167 ᾽Επίνοια is the opposite of ἔννοια, ‘the intuitive idea.’ It means an “afterthought,” and, with the notion
of unnecessary addition, a ‘conceit.’ Here it is applied to conventional, or not purely natural difference. See In-
troduction to Book XIII. for the fuller meaning of ᾽Επίνοια.
168 μὴ δέχοιτο. This use of the optative, where the subjunctive with ἐαν might have been expected, is one of
the few instances in Gregory’s Greek of declension from Classic usage; in the latter, when ει with the optative
does denote subjective possibility, it is only when the condition is conceived of as of frequent repetition, e.g. 1
Peter iii. 14. The optative often in this Greek of the fourth century invades the province of the subjunctive.
He declares falsely that 'the manner of the generation is to be known from the intrinsic worth of the generator'.
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He declares falsely that 'the manner of the generation is to be known from…