The habitual connexion, which is in men’s minds between Blamelessness and those
forementioned terms, must, cannot, unable, necessary, impossible, unavoidable, &c. becomes
very strong, because, as soon as ever men begin to use reason and speech, they have occasion
to excuse themselves, from the natural necessity signified by these terms, in numerous in-
stances.—I cannot do it—I could not help it.—And all mankind have constant and daily oc-
casion to use such phrases in this sense, to excuse themselves and others, in almost all the
concerns of life, with respect to disappointments, and things that happen, which concern
and affect ourselves and others, that are hurtful, or disagreeable to us or them, or things
desirable, that we or others fail to obtain.
That our being accustomed to an union of different ideas, from early childhood, makes
the habitual connexion exceeding strong, as though such connexion were owing to nature,
is manifest in innumerable instances. It is altogether by such an habitual connexion of ideas,
that men judge of the bigness or distance of the objects of sight, from their appearance. Thus
it is owing to such a connexion early established, and growing up with a person, that he
judges a mountain, which he sees at ten miles distance, to be bigger than his nose, or further
off than the end of it. Having been used so long to join a considerable distance and magnitude
with such an appearance, men imagine it is by a dictate of natural sense: whereas, it would
be quite otherwise with one that had his eyes newly opened, who had been born blind: he
would have the same visible appearance, but natural sense would dictate no such thing,
concerning the magnitude or distance of what appeared.
III. When men, after they had been so habituated to connect ideas of Innocency or
Blamelessness with such terms, that the union seems to be the effect of mere nature, come
to hear the same terms used, and learn to use them in the forementioned new and metaphys-
ical sense, to signify quite another sort of necessity, which has no such kind of relation to a
contrary supposable Will and endeavour; the notation of plain and manifest Blamelessness,
by this means, is, by a strong prejudice, insensibly and unwarily transferred to a case to
which it by no means belongs: the change of the use of the terms, to a signification which
is very diverse, not being taken notice of, or adverted to. And there are several reasons why
it is not.
l. The terms, as used by philosophers, are not very distinct and clear in their meaning:
few use them in a fixed determined sense. On the contrary, their meaning is very vague and
confused. Which commonly happens to the words used to signify things intellectual and
moral, and to express what Mr. Locke calls mixt modes. If men had a clear and distinct un-
derstanding of what is intended by these metaphysical terms, they would be able more easily
to compare them with their original and common sense; and so would not be so easily led
into delusion by words of this sort.
2. The change of the signification of the terms is the more insensible, because the things
signified, though indeed very different, yet do in some generals agree. In necessity, that which
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SECTION III. The reasons why some think it contrary to common Sense, to…