7. Well, then, let us look at the first. Many of the Greeks, handling the matter with caution, and supposing events to be ruled by necessity, and that man's Free Will cannot be at all maintained if God foreknows the future, ventured to hold an impious doctrine, rather than admit, as they allow it to be, a glorious attribute of God, but one destructive of Free Will, and which therefore does away with the distinction between praise and blame, the acceptability of virtue and the censure of vice. They tell us that if God from everlasting knows that a certain person will be unjust, and will do certain unjust deeds, and if the knowledge of God be infallible, and if he that is foreseen to have such a character will certainly be unjust and will do these unjust deeds, his injustice is necessitated, and it will be impossible for his conduct to be other than what God knew it would be. But if his conduct could not be different, and no one is to be blamed for not doing impossibilities, it is no use for us to accuse the unjust. And from the unjust man and his unjust deeds they pass on to the other sins a man may commit, and, on the contrary, to what is considered upright conduct; and they say that consistently with God's foreknowledge our Free Will cannot possibly be maintained.