contemplation of them when absent. My idea of the sun when I look upon it is more vivid,
than when I only think of it. Our idea of the sweet relish of a delicious fruit is usually stronger
when we taste it, than when we only imagine it. And sometimes, the idea we have of things
by contemplation, are much stronger and clearer, than at other times. Thus, a man at one
time has a much stronger idea of the pleasure which is to be enjoyed in eating some sort of
food that he loves, than at another. Now the strength of the idea or the sense that men have
of future good or evil, is one thing that has great influence on their minds to excite volition.
When two kinds of future pleasure are presented for choice, though both are supposed exactly
equal by the judgment, and both equally certain, yet of one the mind has a far more lively
sense, than of the other; this last has the greatest advantage by far to affect and attract the
mind, and move the Will. It is now more agreeable to the mind, to take the pleasure of which
it has a strong and lively sense, than that of which it has only a faint idea. The view of the
former is attended with the strongest appetite, and the greatest uneasiness attends the want
of it; and it is agreeable to the mind to have uneasiness removed, and its appetite gratified.
And if several future enjoyments are presented together, as competitors for the choice of
the mind, some of them judged to be greater, and others less; the mind also having a more
lively idea of the good of some, and of others a less; and some are viewed as of greater cer-
tainty or probability than others; and those enjoyments that appear most agreeable in one
of these respects, appear least so in others: in this case, all other things being equal, the
agreeableness of a proposed object of choice will be in a degree some way compounded of
the degree of good supposed by the judgment, the degree of apparent probability or certainty
of that good, and the degree of the liveliness of the idea the mind has of that good; because
all together concur to constitute the degree in which the object appears at present agreeable;
and accordingly will volition be determined.
I might further observe, that the state of the mind which views a proposed object of
choice, is another thing that contributes to the agreeableness or disagreeableness of that
object; the particular temper which the mind has by nature, or that has been introduced
and established by education, example, custom, or some other means; or the frame or state
that the mind is in on a particular occasion. That object which appears agreeable to one,
does not so to another. And the same object does not always appear alike agreeable to the
same person, at different times. It is most agreeable to some men, to follow their reason;
and to others, to follow their appetites: to some men, it is more agreeable to deny a vicious
inclination, than to gratify it; others it suits best to gratify the vilest appetites. It is more
disagreeable to some men than others, to counteract a former resolution. In these respects,
and many others which might be mentioned, different things will be most agreeable to dif-
ferent persons; and not only so, but to the same persons at different times.
But possibly it is needless to mention the “state of the mind,’’ as a ground of the agree-
ableness of objects distinct from the other two mentioned before; viz. The apparent nature
525
SECTION II. Concerning the Determination of the Will.