to each of the Three Persons, yet cannot properly be employed in the plural. That in the
case of three individual “men” the term expressive of essence is employed in the plural is
due, he says, to the fact that in this case there are circumstances which excuse or constrain
such a use of the term “man” while such circumstances do not affect the case of the Holy
Trinity. The individuals included under the term “man” vary alike in number and in identity,
and thus we are constrained to speak of “men” as more or fewer, and in a certain sense to
treat the essence as well as the persons numerically. In the Holy Trinity, on the other hand,
the Persons are always the same, and their number the same. Nor are the Persons of the
Holy Trinity differentiated, like individual men, by relations of time and place, and the like;
the differentiation between them is based upon a constant causal relation existing among
the Three Persons, which does not affect the unity of the Nature: it does not express the
Being, but the mode of Being50. The Father is the Cause; the Son and the Holy Spirit are
differentiated from Him as being from the Cause, and again differentiated inter se as being
immediately from the Cause, and immediately through that which is from the Cause. Further,
while these reasons may be alleged for holding that the cases are not in such a sense parallel
as to allow that the same conclusion as to modes of speech should be drawn in both, he
urges that the use of the term “men” in the plural is, strictly speaking, erroneous. We should,
in strictness, speak not of “this or that man,” but of “this or that hypostasis of man”—the
“three men” should be described as “three hypostases” of the common οὐσία “man.” In the
treatise addressed to Ablabius he goes over the same ground, clothing his arguments in a
somewhat less philosophical dress; but he devotes more space to an examination of the
meaning of the term θεός, with a view to showing that it is a term expressive of operation,
and thereby of essence, not a term which may be considered as applicable to any one of the
Divine Persons in any such peculiar sense that it may not equally be applied also to the
other two51. His argument is partly based upon an etymology now discredited, but this does
not affect the position he seeks to establish (a position which is also adopted in the treatise,
De S. Trinitate), that names expressive of the Divine Nature, or of the Divine operation (by
which alone that Nature is known to us) are employed, and ought to be employed, only in
the singular. The unity and inseparability of all Divine operation, proceeding from the
50 This statement strikes at the root of the theory held by Eunomius, as well as by the earlier Arians, that the
ἀγεννησία of the Father constituted His Essence. S. Gregory treats His ἀγεννησία as that by which He is distin-
guished from the other Persons, as an attribute marking His hypostasis. This subject is treated more fully, with
special reference to the Eunomian view, in the Ref. alt. libri Eunomii.
51 S. Gregory would apparently extend this argument even to the operations expressed by the names of “Re-
deemer,” or “Comforter;” though he would admit that in regard of the mode by which these operations are applied
to man, the names expressive of them are used in a special sense of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, yet he would
argue that in neither case does the one Person act without the other two.
46
His Teaching on the Holy Trinity.