Chapter 6.—Of the Error of Human Judgments When the Truth is Hidden.
What shall I say of these judgments which men pronounce on men, and which are ne-
cessary in communities, whatever outward peace they enjoy? Melancholy and lamentable
judgments they are, since the judges are men who cannot discern the consciences of those
at their bar, and are therefore frequently compelled to put innocent witnesses to the torture
to ascertain the truth regarding the crimes of other men. What shall I say of torture applied
to the accused himself? He is tortured to discover whether he is guilty, so that, though in-
nocent, he suffers most undoubted punishment for crime that is still doubtful, not because
it is proved that he committed it, but because it is not ascertained that he did not commit
it. Thus the ignorance of the judge frequently involves an innocent person in suffering.
And what is still more unendurable—a thing, indeed, to be bewailed, and, if that were pos-
sible, watered with fountains of tears—is this, that when the judge puts the accused to the
question, that he may not unwittingly put an innocent man to death, the result of this lam-
entable ignorance is that this very person, whom he tortured that he might not condemn
him if innocent, is condemned to death both tortured and innocent. For if he has chosen,
in obedience to the philosophical instructions to the wise man, to quit this life rather than
endure any longer such tortures, he declares that he has committed the crime which in fact
he has not committed. And when he has been condemned and put to death, the judge is
still in ignorance whether he has put to death an innocent or a guilty person, though he put
the accused to the torture for the very purpose of saving himself from condemning the in-
nocent; and consequently he has both tortured an innocent man to discover his innocence,
and has put him to death without discovering it. If such darkness shrouds social life, will a
wise judge take his seat on the bench or no? Beyond question he will. For human society,
which he thinks it a wickedness to abandon, constrains him and compels him to this duty.
And he thinks it no wickedness that innocent witnesses are tortured regarding the crimes
of which other men are accused; or that the accused are put to the torture, so that they are
often overcome with anguish, and, though innocent, make false confessions regarding
themselves, and are punished; or that, though they be not condemned to die, they often die
during, or in consequence of, the torture; or that sometimes the accusers, who perhaps have
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been prompted by a desire to benefit society by bringing criminals to justice, are themselves
condemned through the ignorance of the judge, because they are unable to prove the truth
of their accusations though they are true, and because the witnesses lie, and the accused
endures the torture without being moved to confession. These numerous and important
evils he does not consider sins; for the wise judge does these things, not with any intention
of doing harm, but because his ignorance compels him, and because human society claims
him as a judge. But though we therefore acquit the judge of malice, we must none the less
condemn human life as miserable. And if he is compelled to torture and punish the innocent
because his office and his ignorance constrain him, is he a happy as well as a guiltless man?
Of the Error of Human Judgments When the Truth is Hidden.
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Of the Error of Human Judgments When the Truth is Hidden.