or wanting, in that, belonging to its state or acts, which is original and determining in the
affair, that man is morally unable to obey that Command.
This is manifest from what was observed in the first part concerning the nature of
moral Inability, as distinguished from natural: where it was observed, that a man may then
be said to be morally unable to do a thing, when he is under the influence or prevalence of
a contrary inclination, or has a want of inclination, under such circumstances and views. It
is also evident, from what has been before proved, that the Will is always, and in every indi-
vidual act, necessarily determined by the strongest motive; 132 and so is always unable to
go against the motive, which, all things considered, has now the greatest strength and ad-
vantage to move the Will.—But not further to insist on these things, the truth of the position
now laid down, viz. that when the Will is opposite to, or failing of a compliance with, a
thing, in its original determination or act, it is not able to comply, appears by the consideration
of these two things.
1. The Will in the time of that diverse or opposite leading act or inclination, and when
actually under its influence, is not able to exert itself to the contrary, to make an alteration,
in order to a compliance. The inclination is unable to change itself; and that for this plain
132 Our author does not mean by “motive,” the object presented to the mind according to its intrinsic worth;
but he takes into the account also the state of the mind itself, in reference to that object, according to which will
be the appearance of it. Therefore, strictly speaking, the motive, as he has intimated at the commencement of
this work, denotes the object as it stands in the view of the mind. If we do not maintain this distinction, the
dispute will soon degenerate into a confused logomachy; and we should be forced, in defending this position—that
the will is “necessarily determined by the strongest motive”—to adopt this, the most absurd of all conclusions,
that the will of every man in the present state always chooses what is really best, or never errs in its elections.
Whereas the world is full of errors and delusions; things the most excellent in themselves, are commonly rejected,
and others the most worthless are preferred. But this could not happen, except on this principle, that the reality
of worth differs, in those instances, from the appearance of it. In such cases, the difference is not in the object,
but in the mind, when the choice takes place. For instance; suppose the blessed God in his true character as re-
vealed in the Scriptures, the chief and an unchangeable good, be proposed to the contemplation of a wicked
man, and his will rejects that good. Now, as the mind is incapable of rejecting a good, or of choosing an evil, as
such; it is plain, that the proper and immediate cause of difference between the reality and the appearance of
good, is in the state of the mind. Here lies the essence of an erroneous choice,—the will preferring an object
which is apparently but not really preferable. Hence it follows irrefragably, that the state of the mind is the true
and proper source of a right and wrong choice. This is it that influences the appearance of an object, so as to
stand in the apprehension and practical judgement of the mind as worse or better than it really is. Therefore,
the true state of the mind and the real state of the object of choice, united, are the genuine parents of the objective
appearance in the mind, morally considered, or according to the qualities of good and evil; and this offspring—ob-
jective appearance— is what our author calls “the strongest motive.”—W.
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SECTION IV. Command and Obligation of Obedience, consistent with moral…