is carried beside the proper mark. There being, then, two factors by which every term is
made a correct term, the mental exactitude and the verbal utterance, the result which com-
mands approval in both ways, will certainly be the preferable; but it will not be a lesser gain,
not to have missed the right conception, even though the word itself may happen to be in-
adequate to that thought. Whenever then, our thought is intent upon those high and unseen
things which sense cannot reach (I mean, upon that divine and unspeakable world with regard
to which it is an audacious thing to grasp in thought anything in it at random and more
audacious still to trust to any chance word the representing of the conception arising from
it), then, I say, turning from the mere sound of phrases, uttered well or ill according to the
mental faculty of the speaker, we search for the thought, and that alone, which is found
within the phrases, to see whether that itself be sound, or otherwise; and we leave the minutiæ
of phrase and name to be dealt with by the artificialities of grammarians. Now, seeing that
we mark with an appellation only those things which we know, and those things which are
above our knowledge it is not possible to seize by any distinctive terms (for how can one
put a mark upon a thing we know nothing about?), therefore, because in such cases there
is no appropriate term to be found to mark the subject adequately, we are compelled by
many and differing names, as there may be opportunity, to divulge our surmises as they
arise within us with regard to the Deity. But, on the other hand, all that actually comes
within our comprehension is such that it must be of one of these four kinds: either contem-
plated as existing in an extension of distance, or suggesting the idea of a capacity in space
within which its details are detected, or it comes within our field of vision by being circum-
scribed by a beginning or an end where the non-existent bounds it in each direction (for
everything that has a beginning and an end of its existence, begins from the non-existent,
and ends in the non-existent), or, lastly, we grasp the phænomenon by means of an associ-
ation of qualities wherein dying, and sufferance, and change, and alteration, and such-like
are combined. Considering this, in order that the Supreme Being may not appear to have
any connection whatever with things below, we use, with regard to His nature, ideas and
phrases expressive of separation from all such conditions; we call, for instance, that which
is above all times pre-temporal, that which is above beginning unbeginning, that which is
not brought to an end unending, that which has a personality removed from body incorpor-
eal, that which is never destroyed imperishable, that which is unreceptive of change, or
sufferance, or alteration, passionless, changeless, and unalterable. Such a class of appellations
can be reduced to any system that they like by those who wish for one; and they can fix on
these actual appellations other appellations “privative,” for instance, or “negative,” or
whatever they like. We yield the teaching and the learning of such things to those who are
ambitious for it; and we will investigate the thoughts alone, whether they are within or
beyond the circle of a religious and adequate conception of the Deity.
576
Answer to Eunomius' Second Book.