according to the doctrine of the infinite divisibility of matter, is composed of infinitely more
assignable parts, than there are particles of dust and water in the globe of the earth. And as
it is infinitely unlikely, that any two of these particles should be equal; so it is, that they
should be alike in other respects: to instance in the configuration of their surfaces. If there
were very many globes, of the nature of the earth, it would be very unlikely that any two
should have exactly the same number of particles of dust, water, and stone, in their surfaces,
and all posited exactly alike, one with respect to another, without any difference, in any part
discernible either by the naked eye or microscope; but infinitely less strange, than that two
particles of light should be perfectly of the same figure. For there are infinitely more as-
signable real parts on the surface of a particle of light, than there are particles of dust, water,
and stone, on the surface of the terrestrial globe.
Answ. (2.) But then, supposing that there are two particles, or atoms of matter, perfectly
equal and alike, which God has placed in different parts of the creation; as I will not deny
it to be possible for God to make two bodies perfectly alike, and put them in different places;
yet it will not follow, that two different or distinct acts or effects of the Divine Power have
exactly the same fitness for the same ends. For these two different bodies are not different
or distinct, in any other respects than those wherein they differ: they are two in no other
respects than those wherein there is a difference. If they are perfectly equal and alike in
themselves, then they can be distinguished, or be distinct, only in those things which are
called circumstances; as place, time, rest, motion, or some other present or past circumstances
or relations. For it is difference only that constitutes distinction. If God makes two bodies,
in themselves every way equal and alike, and agreeing perfectly in all other circumstances
and relations, but only their place; then in this only is there any distinction or duplicity. The
figure is the same, the measure is the same, the solidity and resistance are the same, and
every thing the same but only the place. Therefore what the Will of God determines is this,
that there should be the same figure, the same extension, the same resistance, &c. in two
different places. And for this determination he has some reason. There is some end, for
which such a determination and act has a peculiar fitness, above all other acts. Here is no
one thing determined without an end, and no one thing without a fitness for that end, su-
perior to any thing else. If it be the pleasure of God to cause the same resistance, and the
same figure, to be in two different places and situations, we can no more justly argue from
it, that here must be some determination or act of God’s Will that is wholly without motive
or end, than we can argue, that whenever, in any case, it is a man’s Will to speak the same
words, or make the same sounds, at two different times, there must be some determination
or act of his Will, without any motive or end. The difference of place, in the former case,
proves no more than the difference of time does in the other. If any one should say, with
regard to the former case, that there must be something determined without an end; viz.
that of those two similar bodies, this in particular should be made in this place, and the
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SECTION VIII. Some further objections against the moral Necessity of God's…