VII. Whether Our Soul is Rational.
That our soul is rational, one might demonstrate by many arguments. And first of all
from the fact that it has discovered the arts that are for the service of our life. For no one
could say that these arts were introduced casually and accidentally, as no one could prove
them to be idle, and of no utility for our life. If, then, these arts contribute to what is profitable
for our life, and if the profitable is commendable, and if the commendable is constituted by
reason, and if these things are the discovery of the soul, it follows that our soul is rational.
Again, that our soul is rational, is also proved by the fact that our senses are not sufficient
for the apprehension of things. For we are not competent for the knowledge of things by
the simple application of the faculty of sensation. But as we do not choose to rest in these
without inquiry,457 that proves that the senses, apart from reason, are felt to be incapable
of discriminating between things which are identical in form and similar in colour, though
quite distinct in their natures. If, therefore, the senses, apart from reason, give us a false
conception of things, we have to consider whether things that are can be apprehended in
reality or not. And if they can be apprehended, then the power which enables us to get at
them is one different from, and superior to, the senses. And if they are not apprehended, it
will not be possible for us at all to apprehend things which are different in their appearance
from the reality. But that objects are apprehensible by us, is clear from the fact that we employ
each in a way adaptable to utility, and again turn them to what we please. Consequently, if
it has been shown that things which are can be apprehended by us, and if the senses, apart
from reason, are an erroneous test of objects, it follows that the intellect458 is what distin-
guishes all things in reason, and discerns things as they are in their actuality. But the intellect
is just the rational portion of the soul, and consequently the soul is rational.
Finally, because we do nothing without having first marked it out for ourselves; and as
that is nothing else than just the high prerogative459 of the soul,—for its knowledge of things
does not come to it from without, but it rather sets out these things, as it were, with the ad-
ornment of its own thoughts, and thus first pictures forth the object in itself, and only
thereafter carries it out to actual fact,—and because the high prerogative of the soul is
nothing else than the doing of all things with reason, in which respect it also differs from
the senses, the soul has thereby been demonstrated to be rational.
457 ἐπεὶ μηδὲ στῆναι περὶ αὐτὰ θέλομεν.
458 νοῦς.
459 ἀξίωμα. [Elucidation II.]
Section VII.
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Section VII.