Testimonia

{"author":null,"backreferences":[{"context_html":"<p>Among the philosophers there are two opinions about these\r\nmental emotions, which the Greeks call πάθη, while some of\r\nour own writers, as Cicero, call them perturbations,<a id=\"FNanchor_331_331\"></a><a class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_331_331\">[331]</a> some<span class=\"pagenum\"><a id=\"Page_356\">[Pg 356]</a></span>\r\naffections, and some, to render the Greek word more accurately,\r\npassions. Some say that even the wise man is subject\r\nto these perturbations, though moderated and controlled by\r\nreason, which imposes laws upon them, and so restrains them\r\nwithin necessary bounds. This is the opinion of the Platonists\r\nand Aristotelians; for Aristotle was Plato's disciple, and the\r\nfounder of the Peripatetic school. But others, as the Stoics,\r\nare of opinion that the wise man is not subject to these perturbations.\r\nBut Cicero, in his book <i>De Finibus</i>, shows that\r\nthe Stoics are here at variance with the Platonists and Peripatetics\r\nrather in words than in reality; for the Stoics decline\r\nto apply the term \"goods\" to external and bodily advantages,<a id=\"FNanchor_332_332\"></a><a class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_332_332\">[332]</a>\r\nbecause they reckon that the only good is virtue, the art of\r\nliving well, and this exists only in the mind. The other\r\nphilosophers, again, use the simple and customary phraseology,\r\nand do not scruple to call these things goods, though in comparison\r\nof virtue, which guides our life, they are little and of\r\nsmall esteem. And thus it is obvious that, whether these\r\noutward things are called goods or advantages, they are held\r\nin the same estimation by both parties, and that in this\r\nmatter the Stoics are pleasing themselves merely with a novel\r\nphraseology. It seems, then, to me that in this question,\r\nwhether the wise man is subject to mental passions, or wholly\r\nfree from them, the controversy is one of words rather than\r\nof things; for I think that, if the reality and not the mere\r\nsound of the words is considered, the Stoics hold precisely the\r\nsame opinion as the Platonists and Peripatetics. For, omitting\r\nfor brevity's sake other proofs which I might adduce in support\r\nof this opinion, I will state but one which I consider\r\nconclusive. Aulus Gellius, a man of extensive erudition, and\r\ngifted with an eloquent and graceful style, relates, in his work\r\nentitled <i>Noctes Atticæ</i>,<a id=\"FNanchor_333_333\"></a><a class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_333_333\">[333]</a> that he once made a voyage with an\r\neminent Stoic philosopher; and he goes on to relate fully and\r\nwith gusto what I shall barely state, that when the ship was\r\ntossed and in danger from a violent storm, the philosopher<span class=\"pagenum\"><a id=\"Page_357\">[Pg 357]</a></span>\r\ngrew pale with terror. This was noticed by those on board,\r\nwho, though themselves threatened with death, were curious\r\nto see whether a philosopher would be agitated like other\r\nmen. When the tempest had passed over, and as soon as\r\ntheir security gave them freedom to resume their talk, one\r\nof the passengers, a rich and luxurious Asiatic, begins to\r\nbanter the philosopher, and rally him because he had even\r\nbecome pale with fear, while he himself had been unmoved\r\nby the impending destruction. But the philosopher availed\r\nhimself of the reply of Aristippus the Socratic, who, on finding\r\nhimself similarly bantered by a man of the same character,\r\nanswered, \"You had no cause for anxiety for the soul of a\r\nprofligate debauchee, but I had reason to be alarmed for the\r\nsoul of Aristippus.\" The rich man being thus disposed of,\r\nAulus Gellius asked the philosopher, in the interests of science\r\nand not to annoy him, what was the reason of his fear? And\r\nhe, willing to instruct a man so zealous in the pursuit of\r\nknowledge, at once took from his wallet a book of Epictetus\r\nthe Stoic,<a id=\"FNanchor_334_334\"></a><a class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_334_334\">[334]</a> in which doctrines were advanced which precisely\r\nharmonized with those of Zeno and Chrysippus, the founders\r\nof the Stoical school. Aulus Gellius says that he read in\r\nthis book that the Stoics maintain that there are certain\r\nimpressions made on the soul by external objects which they\r\ncall <i>phantasiæ</i>, and that it is not in the power of the soul to\r\ndetermine whether or when it shall be invaded by these.\r\nWhen these impressions are made by alarming and formidable\r\nobjects, it must needs be that they move the soul even of the\r\nwise man, so that for a little he trembles with fear, or is\r\ndepressed by sadness, these impressions anticipating the work\r\nof reason and self-control; but this does not imply that the\r\nmind accepts these evil impressions, or approves or consents\r\nto them. For this consent is, they think, in a man's power;\r\nthere being this difference between the mind of the wise man\r\nand that of the fool, that the fool's mind yields to these passions\r\nand consents to them, while that of the wise man, though it\r\ncannot help being invaded by them, yet retains with unshaken\r\nfirmness a true and steady persuasion of those things which\r\nit ought rationally to desire or avoid. This account of what<span class=\"pagenum\"><a id=\"Page_358\">[Pg 358]</a></span>\r\nAulus Gellius relates that he read in the book of Epictetus\r\nabout the sentiments and doctrines of the Stoics I have given\r\nas well as I could, not, perhaps, with his choice language, but\r\nwith greater brevity, and, I think, with greater clearness.\r\nAnd if this be true, then there is no difference, or next to\r\nnone, between the opinion of the Stoics and that of the other\r\nphilosophers regarding mental passions and perturbations, for\r\nboth parties agree in maintaining that the mind and reason of\r\nthe wise man are not subject to these. And perhaps what\r\nthe Stoics mean by asserting this, is that the wisdom which\r\ncharacterizes the wise man is clouded by no error and sullied\r\nby no taint, but, with this reservation that his wisdom\r\nremains undisturbed, he is exposed to the impressions which\r\nthe goods and ills of this life (or, as they prefer to call them,\r\nthe advantages or disadvantages) make upon them. For we\r\nneed not say that if that philosopher had thought nothing of\r\nthose things which he thought he was forthwith to lose, life\r\nand bodily safety, he would not have been so terrified by his\r\ndanger as to betray his fear by the pallor of his cheek.\r\nNevertheless, he might suffer this mental disturbance, and\r\nyet maintain the fixed persuasion that life and bodily safety,\r\nwhich the violence of the tempest threatened to destroy, are\r\nnot those good things which make their possessors good, as\r\nthe possession of righteousness does. But in so far as they\r\npersist that we must call them not goods but advantages,\r\nthey quarrel about words and neglect things. For what\r\ndifference does it make whether goods or advantages be the\r\nbetter name, while the Stoic no less than the Peripatetic is\r\nalarmed at the prospect of losing them, and while, though they\r\nname them differently, they hold them in like esteem? Both\r\nparties assure us that, if urged to the commission of some\r\nimmorality or crime by the threatened loss of these goods or\r\nadvantages, they would prefer to lose such things as preserve\r\nbodily comfort and security rather than commit such things\r\nas violate righteousness. And thus the mind in which this\r\nresolution is well grounded suffers no perturbations to prevail\r\nwith it in opposition to reason, even though they assail the\r\nweaker parts of the soul; and not only so, but it rules over\r\nthem, and, while it refuses its consent and resists them, administers<span class=\"pagenum\"><a id=\"Page_359\">[Pg 359]</a></span>\r\na reign of virtue. Such a character is ascribed to\r\nÆneas by Virgil when he says,</p>","headings":["THE WORKS OF AURELIUS AUGUSTINE,","BOOK NINTH.","ARGUMENT."],"marker_anchor":null,"paragraph_id":"pg45304-paragraph-632"}],"canonical_references":[],"date_end":null,"date_start":null,"deduplication_fingerprint":"d1df5a8990cfe7a51728c8fef5ab93bc668ae40d4e8d21b1515a9327a55da6bd","edition_title":"The City of God, Volume I","edition_translators":["Marcus Dods","George Wilson (Book IV)","J. J. Smith (Books V-VIII)"],"edition_year":1871,"explicit_reference_candidates":[],"headings":[],"id":"pg45304-Footnote_333_333","license_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/policy/license.html","public_import_allowed":false,"record_kind":"original-editor-translator-note","review_required":["work and recension attribution","original-work chronology","Bible reference numbering and citation kind","English edition rights and attribution"],"review_status":"needs_review","rights_evidence":"Provider catalog reports public domain in the USA. Original transcription title leaves state T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh, 1871; printed translator allocation retained. Gutenberg credits Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries without an exact scan identifier. Full provider license preserved with acquired original; republication and per-work metadata remain unreviewed.","source_anchor":"Footnote_333_333","source_ebook":45304,"source_html":"<div class=\"footnote\">\n<p><a id=\"Footnote_333_333\"></a><a class=\"pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_333_333\"><span class=\"label\">[333]</span></a> Book xix. ch. 1.</p></div>","source_sha256":"d89e9a2b80bb59f394f0fb1bf313b39fab162f06af6642166d62c5912c1195f1","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/45304/pg45304-images.html#Footnote_333_333","text_sha256":"d2d7ea59372f417155005f8e5161ef9b3fe6c609515e819fcacc24f13d374bca","verified":false,"work_id":null}

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