to the circumference should be equal. It is necessary, fit and suitable, that men should do
to others, as they would that they should do to them. So innumerable metaphysical and
mathematical truths are necessary in themselves: the subject and predicate of the proposition
which affirm them, are perfectly connected of themselves.
(2.) The connexion of the subject and predicate of a proposition, which affirms the ex-
istence of something, may be fixed and made certain, because the existence of that thing is
already come to pass; and either now is, or has been; and so has, as it were, made sure of
existence. And therefore, the proposition which affirms present and past existence of it, may
by this means be made certain, and necessarily and unalterably true; the past event has fixed
and decided the matter, as to its existence; and has made it impossible but that existence
should be truly predicated of it. Thus the existence of whatever is already come to pass, is
now become necessary; it is become impossible it should be otherwise than true, that such
a thing has been.
(3.) The subject and predicate of a proposition which affirms something to be, may have
a real and certain connexion consequentially; and so the existence of the thing may be con-
sequentially necessary; as it may be surely and firmly connected with something else, that is
necessary in one of the former respects. As it is either fully and thoroughly connected with
that which is absolutely necessary in its own nature, or with something which has already
received and made sure of existence. This Necessity lies in, or may be explained by, the
connexion of two or more propositions one with another.—Things which are perfectly
connected with other things that are necessary, are necessary themselves, by a Necessity of
consequence.
And here it may be observed, that all things which are future, or which will hereafter
begin to be, which can be said to be necessary, are necessary only in this last way. Their ex-
istence is not necessary in itself; for if so, they always would have existed. Nor is their existence
become necessary by being already come to pass. Therefore, the only way that any thing
that is to come to pass hereafter, is or can be necessary, is by a connexion with something
that is necessary in its own nature, or something that already is, or has been; so that the one
being supposed the other certainly follows.—And this also is the only way that all things
past, excepting those which were from eternity, could be necessary before the come to pass;
and therefore the only way in which any effect or event, or any thing whatsoever that ever
has had or will have a beginning, has come into being necessarily, or will hereafter necessarily
exist. And therefore this is the Necessity which especially belongs to controversies about
the acts of the will.
It may be of some use in these controversies, further to observe concerning metaphysical
Necessity, that (agreeable to the distinction before observed of Necessity, as vulgarly under-
stood) things that exist may be said to be necessary, either with a general or particular Ne-
cessity. The existence of a thing may be said to be necessary with a general Necessity, when,
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SECTION III. Concerning the meaning of the terms, Necessity, Impossibility,…