consists in Indifference; and that the opinion of such as suppose, that Indifference belongs
to the very essence of Liberty, is to the highest degree absurd and contradictory.
If any one should imagine, that this manner of arguing is nothing but a trick and delu-
sion; and to evade the reasoning, should say, that the thing wherein the Will exercises its
Liberty, is not in the act of choice or preponderation itself, but in determining itself to a
certain choice or preference; that the act of the Will wherein it is free, and uses its own
sovereignty, consists in its causing or determining the change or transition from a state of
indifference to a certain preference or determining to give a certain turn to the balance,
which has hitherto been even; and that the Will exerts this act in a state of Liberty, or while
the Will yet remains in equilibrium, and perfect master of itself.—I say, if any one chooses
to express his notion of Liberty after this, or some such manner, let us see if he can succeed
any better than before.
What is asserted is, that the Will, while it yet remains in perfect equilibrium, without
preference, determines to change itself from that state, and excite in itself a certain choice
or preference. Now let us see whether this does not come to the same absurdity we had before.
If it be so that the Will, while it yet remains perfectly indifferent, determines to put itself out
of that state, and to give itself a certain preponderation; than I would inquire, whether the
soul does not determine this of choice; or whether the Will coming to a determination to
23
do so, be not the same thing as the soul coming to a choice to do so. If the soul does not
determine this of choice, or in the exercise of choice, then it does not determine it voluntarily.
And if the soul does not determine it voluntarily, or of its own Will, then in what sense does
its Will determine it? And if the Will does not determine it, then how is the Liberty of the
Will exercised in the determination? What sort of Liberty is exercised by the soul in those
determinations, wherein there is no exercise of choice, which are not voluntary, and wherein
the Will is not concerned? But if it be allowed, that this determination is an act of choice,
and it be insisted on, that the soul, while it yet remains in a state of perfect Indifference,
chooses to put itself out of that state, and to turn itself one way; then the soul is already
come to a choice; and chooses that way. And so we have the very same absurdity which we
had before. Here is the soul in a state of choice, and in a state of equilibrium, both at the
same time: the soul already choosing one way, while it remains in a state of perfect Indiffer-
ence, and has no choice of one way more than the other.—And indeed this manner of talking,
though it may a little hide the absurdity, in the obscurity of expression, increases the incon-
sistence. To say, the free act of the Will, or the act which the Will exerts in a state of freedom
and Indifference, does not imply preference in it, but is what the will does in order to cause
or produce a preference, is as much as to say, the soul chooses (for to will and to choose are
the same thing) without choice, and prefers without preference, in order to cause or produce
the beginning of a preference, or the first choice. And that is, that the first choice is exerted
without choice, in order to produce itself!
571
SECTION VII. Concerning the notion of Liberty of Will, consisting in Indifference.…