things. I say, “the primary and most essential beauty,” because there is a secondary and in-
ferior sort of beauty; which I shall take notice of afterwards.
4. This spiritual beauty, which is but a secondary ground of virtuous benevolence, is the
ground, not only of benevolence, but complacence. and is the primary ground of the latter;
that is, when the complacence is truly virtuous. Love to us in particular, and kindness re-
ceived, may be a secondary ground: but this is the primary objective foundation of it.
5. It must be noted, that the degree of the amiableness of true virtue, primarily consisting
in consent, and a benevolent propensity of heart to being in general, is not in the simple
proportion of the degree of benevolent affection seen, but in a proportion compounded of
the greatness of the benevolent being, or the degree of being and the degree of benevolence.
One that loves being in general, will necessarily value good will to being in general, wherever
he sees it. But if he sees the same benevolence in two beings, he will value it more in two,
than in one only. Because it is a greater thing, more favourable to being in general, to have
two beings to favour it, than only one of them. For there is more being that favours being:
both together having more being than one alone. So, if one being be as great as two, has as
much existence as both together, and has the same degree of general benevolence, it is more
favourable to being in general, than if there were general benevolence in a being that had
but half that share of existence. As a large quantity of gold, with the same quality, is more
valuable than a small quantity of the same metal.
6. It is impossible that any one should truly relish this beauty, consisting in general be-
nevolence, who has not that temper himself. I have observed, that if any being is possessed
of such a temper, he will unavoidably be pleased with same temper in another. And it may
in like manner be demonstrated, that it is such a spirit, and nothing else, which will relish
such a spirit. For if a being, destitute of benevolence, should love benevolence to being in
general, it would prize and seek that for which it had no value. For how should one love and
value a disposition to a thing, or a tendency to promote it, and for that very reason, when the
thing itself is what he is regardless of, and has no value for, nor desires to have promoted.
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227
227 In this masterly Dissertation on the nature of virtue, our author enters at once on his own definition of
the term, and explains very clearly what he means by true virtue. His views, in some respects, are considerably
different from those which are most current among ethical writers; and, probably, for want of some explanations,
whereby the different definitions adopted by others may be accounted for, his invaluable treatise has not only
been underrated, but even, by some, unreasonably opposed. We shall here offer a few remarks, which, perhaps,
may tend to cast some light on the subject in general, as well as to relieve our author’s definition from unfair
imputations. 1. Virtue, if we regard the use of the term ( ) among the NOT ENGLISHs, seems to have been
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CHAPTER I. Concerning the essence of true virtue.