Chapter VII.
Yet let no one ask, “How was it that, if God foresaw the misfortune that would happen
to man from want of thought, He came to create him, since it was, perhaps, more to his
advantage not to have been born than to be in the midst of such evils?” This is what they
who have been carried away by the false teaching of the Manichees put forward for the es-
tablishment of their error, as thus able to show that the Creator of human nature is evil. For
if God is not ignorant of anything that is, and yet man is in the midst of evil, the argument
for the goodness of God could not be upheld; that is, if He brought forth into life the man
who was to be in this evil. For if the operating force which is in accordance with the good
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is entirely that of a nature which is good, then this painful and perishing life, they say, can
never be referred to the workmanship of the good, but it is necessary to suppose for such a
life as this another author, from whom our nature derives its tendency to misery. Now all
these and the like assertions seem to those who are thoroughly imbued with the heretical
fraud, as with some deeply ingrained stain, to have a certain force from their superficial
plausibility. But they who have a more thorough insight into the truth clearly perceive that
what they say is unsound, and admits of speedy demonstration of its fallacy. In my opinion,
too, it is well to put forward the Apostle as pleading with us on these points for their con-
demnation. In his address to the Corinthians he makes a distinction between the carnal and
spiritual dispositions of souls; showing, I think, by what he says that it is wrong to judge of
what is morally excellent, or, on the other hand, of what is evil, by the standard of the senses;
but that, by withdrawing the mind from bodily phenomena, we must decide by itself and
from itself the true nature of moral excellence and of its opposite. “The spiritual man,” he
says, “judgeth all things1960.” This, I think, must have been the reason of the invention of
these deceptive doctrines on the part of those who propound them, viz. that when they
define the good they have an eye only to the sweetness of the body’s enjoyment, and so,
because from its composite nature and constant tendency to dissolution that body is un-
avoidably subject to suffering and sicknesses, and because upon such conditions of suffering
there follows a sort of sense of pain, they decree that the formation of man is the work of
an evil deity. Since, if their thoughts had taken a loftier view, and, withdrawing their minds
from this disposition to regard the gratifications of the senses, they had looked at the nature
of existing things dispassionately, they would have understood that there is no evil other
than wickedness. Now all wickedness has its form and character in the deprivation of the
good; it exists not by itself, and cannot be contemplated as a subsistence. For no evil of any
kind lies outside and independent of the will; but it is the non-existence of the good that is
so denominated. Now that which is not has no substantial existence, and the Maker of that
which has no substantial existence is not the Maker of things that have substantial existence.
1960 1 Cor. ii. 15.
Chapter VII
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Chapter VII