[59.] Judgment. The mind passes a judgment, in multitudes of cases, where it has learned
to judge by perpetual experience, not only exceedingly quick, as soon as one thought can
follow another, but absolutely without any reflection at all, and at the same moment, without
any time intervening. Though the thing is not properly self-evident, yet it judges without
any ratiocination, merely by force of habit. Thus, when I hear such and such sounds, or see
such letters, I judge that such things are signified without reasoning. When I have such ideas
coming in by my sense of seeing, appearing after such a manner, I judge without any reas-
oning, that the things are further off, than others that appear after such a manner. When I
see a globe, I judge it to be a globe, though the image impressed on my sensory is only that
of a flat circle, appearing variously in various parts. And in ten thousand other cases, the
ideas are habitually associated together, and they come into the mind together.—So likewise,
in innumerable cases, men act without any proper act of the Will at that time commanding,
through habit. As when a man is walking, there is not a new act of the Will every time a
man takes up his foot and sets it down.
Coroll. Hence there is no necessity of allowing reason to Beasts, in many of those actions,
that many are ready to argue are rational actions. As cattle in a team are wont to act as the
driver would have them, upon his making such and such sounds, either to stop or go along,
or turn hither or thither, because they have been forced to do it, by the whip, upon the using
of such words. It is become habitual, so that they never do it rationally, but either from force
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or from habit. So of all the actions that beasts are taught to perform, dogs, and horses, and
parrots, &c. And those, that they learn of themselves to do, are merely by virtue of appetite
and habitual association of ideas. Thus a horse learns to perform such actions for his food,
because he has accidentally had the perceptions of such actions, associated with the pleasant
perceptions of taste: and so his appetite makes him perform the action, without any reason
or judgment.
The main difference between Men and Beasts is, that Men are capable of reflecting upon
what passes in their own minds. Beasts have nothing but direct consciousness. Men are
capable of viewing what is in themselves, contemplatively. Man was made for spiritual exer-
cises and enjoyments, and therefore is made capable, by reflection, to behold and contemplate
spiritual things. Hence it arises that Man is capable of Religion.
A very great difference between Men and Beasts is, that Beasts have no voluntary actions
about their own thoughts; for it is in this only, that reasoning differs from mere perception
and memory. It is the act of the Will, in bringing its ideas into Contemplation, and ranging
and comparing of them in Reflection and Abstraction. The minds of Beasts, if I may call
them minds, are purely passive with respect to all their ideas. The minds of Men are not
only passive, but abundantly active. Herein probably is the most distinguishing difference
between Men and Beasts. Herein is the difference between Intellectual, or Rational, Will,
and mere Animal Appetite, that the latter is a simple Inclination to, or Aversion from, such
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NO.IV. Remarks in Mental Philosophy. The Mind.