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of things, that are capable of an infinite variety of degrees; some of which are nearer to, and
others are further from, the lowest sufficient degree: and consequently some of the degrees
that are not sufficient, may yet be very near; which renders the matter of very difficult de-
termination; unspeakably more so, that when what is to be distinguished, is the nature of
things, which in all degrees is widely diverse, and even contrary to that which it is to be dis-
tinguished from: as is the case between saving and common grace; which Mr. W. himself
acknowledges. 424 It is more easy to distinguish light from darkness, than to determine the
precise degree of light; and so it is more easy to determine, whether a man be alive or dead,
than whether there be exactly such a certain degree of vigour and liveliness.
This moral sincerity, which Mr. W. insists on, is a most indeterminate uncertain thing;
a phrase without any certain precise meaning; and must for ever remain so. It being not
determined, how much men must be morally sincere; how much they must believe with a
moral sincerity; whether the deeply awakened and convinced sinner must believe, that God
is absolutely sovereign with respect to his salvation, and that Christ is perfectly sufficient to
save him in particular; and to what degree of moral assent and consent, he must believe and
embrace these things, and comply with the terms of the covenant of grace; whether he must
be willing to obey all God’s commands, the most difficult, as well as the most easy, and this
in all circumstances, even the most difficult that can arise in providence; or whether only
in some circumstances; and what, and how many. The Scripture gives us many infallible
rules, by which to distinguish between saving grace, and common. But I know of no rules
given in the Bible, by which men may certainly determine this precise degree of moral sin-
cerity. So that if grace is not the thing which gives a right to sacraments in the sight of God,
we have no certain rule in the Bible, commensurate to the understanding of mankind, by
which to determine when we have a right, and when not.—Now let the impartial reader
judge, which scheme lays the greatest foundation for perplexity to communicants of tender
consciences, concerning their qualifications for the Lord’s supper; and whether this argument
drawn from such a supposed tendency to such perplexity (if there be any force in it) is not
vastly more against Mr. W.‘s scheme, than mine.
And here by the way, let it be noted, that by these things it is again demonstrated, that
the ninth objection, the great argument considered in the preceding section, concerning the
necessity of a known right, in order to a lawful partaking, is exceedingly more against Mr.
W.‘s principles, than mine; inasmuch as, on his principles, it is so much more difficult for
men to know, whether they have a right, or have the prescribed qualification, or not.
424 See his serm. on Christ a King and Witness, (p. 84. e.) where he says, “notwithstanding the visible likeness
of nominal and real Christians, there is a wide difference, as there is between the subjects of christ and the slaves
of the devil.”
2023
SECTION XVI. Tendency to perplexity.