by a man of the same character, answered, “You had no cause for anxiety for the soul of a
profligate debauchee, but I had reason to be alarmed for the soul of Aristippus.” The rich
man being thus disposed of, Aulus Gellius asked the philosopher, in the interests of science
and not to annoy him, what was the reason of his fear? And he willing to instruct a man so
zealous in the pursuit of knowledge, at once took from his wallet a book of Epictetus the
Stoic,339 in which doctrines were advanced which precisely harmonized with those of Zeno
and Chrysippus, the founders of the Stoical school. Aulus Gellius says that he read in this
book that the Stoics maintain that there are certain impressions made on the soul by external
objects which they call phantasiæ, and that it is not in the power of the soul to determine
whether or when it shall be invaded by these. When these impressions are made by alarming
and formidable objects, it must needs be that they move the soul even of the wise man, so
that for a little he trembles with fear, or is depressed by sadness, these impressions anticip-
ating the work of reason and self-control; but this does not imply that the mind accepts
these evil impressions, or approves or consents to them. For this consent is, they think, in
a man’s power; there being this difference between the mind of the wise man and that of
the fool, that the fool’s mind yields to these passions and consents to them, while that of the
wise man, though it cannot help being invaded by them, yet retains with unshaken firmness
a true and steady persuasion of those things which it ought rationally to desire or avoid.
This account of what Aulus Gellius relates that he read in the book of Epictetus about the
sentiments and doctrines of the Stoics I have given as well as I could, not, perhaps, with his
choice language, but with greater brevity, and, I think, with greater clearness. And if this
be true, then there is no difference, or next to none, between the opinion of the Stoics and
that of the other philosophers regarding mental passions and perturbations, for both parties
agree in maintaining that the mind and reason of the wise man are not subject to these.
And perhaps what the Stoics mean by asserting this, is that the wisdom which characterizes
the wise man is clouded by no error and sullied by no taint, but, with this reservation that
his wisdom remains undisturbed, he is exposed to the impressions which the goods and ills
of this life (or, as they prefer to call them, the advantages or disadvantages) make upon
them. For we need not say that if that philosopher had thought nothing of those things
which he thought he was forthwith to lose, life and bodily safety, he would not have been
so terrified by his danger as to betray his fear by the pallor of his cheek. Nevertheless, he
might suffer this mental disturbance, and yet maintain the fixed persuasion that life and
bodily safety, which the violence of the tempest threatened to destroy, are not those good
things which make their possessors good, as the possession of righteousness does. But in
so far as they persist that we must call them not goods but advantages, they quarrel about
words and neglect things. For what difference does it make whether goods or advantages
339 See Diog. Laert. ii. 71.
387
The Opinion of the Peripatetics and Stoics About Mental Emotions.