are from a particular instinct thus directing and limiting them; and not arising from a
principle of general benevolence; for this has no tendency to any such limitation. And though
these affections do not properly arise from the sensitive desires which are between the sexes,
yet they are implanted by the Author of nature chiefly for the same purpose, viz. the preser-
vation or continuation of the world of mankind. Hereby persons become willing to forsake
father and mother, and all their natural relations in the families where they were born and
brought up; for the sake of a stated union with a companion of the other sex, in bearing and
going through that series of labours, anxieties, and pains, requisite to the being, support,
and education of a family of children; and partly also for the comfort of mankind as united
in a marriage-relation. But I suppose few, if any, will deny, that the peculiar natural dispos-
itions there are to mutual affection between the sexes, arise from an instinct or particular
law of nature. And therefore it is manifest, from what has been said already, that those nat-
ural dispositions cannot be of the nature of true virtue.
Another affection which is owing to a particular instinct, is that pity which is natural
to mankind when they see others in great distress. It is acknowledged, that such an affection
is natural to mankind. But I think it evident, that the pity which is general and natural, is
owing to a particular instinct, and is not of the nature of true virtue. I am far from saying,
that there is no such thing as a truly virtuous pity among mankind; or, that none is to be
found, which arises from that truly virtuous divine principle of general benevolence to
sensitive beings. Yet at the same time I think, this is not the case with ALL pity, or with that
disposition to pity which is natural to mankind in common. I think I may be bold to say,
this does not arise from benevolence, nor is it properly called by that name.
If all that uneasiness on the sight of others’ extreme distress, which we call pity, were
properly of the nature of benevolence, then they who are the subjects of this passion, must
needs be in a degree of uneasiness in being sensible of the total want of happiness, of all
such as they would be disposed to pity in extreme distress. For that certainly is the most
direct tendency and operation of benevolence or good will, to desire the happiness of its
object. But now this is not the case universally, where men are disposed to exercise pity.
There are many who would not be sensibly affected with any uneasiness to know that others
were dead—yea men, who are not influenced by the consideration of a future state, but view
death as only a cessation of all sensibility, and consequently an end of all happiness—who
yet would have been moved with pity towards the same persons, if they had seen them under
some very extreme anguish. Some would be moved with pity by seeing a brute-creature
under extreme and long torments, who yet suffer no uneasiness in knowing that many
thousands of them every day cease to live, and so have an end put to all their pleasure. It is
the nature of true benevolence to desire and rejoice in the prosperity and pleasure of its
object; and that, in some proportion to its degree of prevalence. But persons may greatly
pity those that are in extreme pain, whose positive pleasure they may still be very indifferent
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CHAPTER VI. Of particular instincts of nature