[41.] As there is great foundation in Nature for those abstract ideas, which we call Uni-
versals; so there is great foundation in the common circumstances and necessities of mankind,
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and the constant method of things proceeding, for such a tying of simple modes together
to the constituting such mixed modes. This appears from the agreement of languages; for
language is very much made up of the names of Mixed Modes; and we find that almost all
those names, in one language, have names that answer to them in other languages. The same
Mixed Mode has a name given to it by most nations. Whence it appears that most of the
inhabitants of the Earth have agreed upon putting together the same Simple Modes into
Mixed ones, and in the same manner. The learned and polished have indeed many more
than others: and herein chiefly it is, that languages do not answer one to another.
[42.] The agreement or similitude of Complex ideas, mostly consists in their precise
identity, with respect to some third idea of some of the simples they are compounded of.
But it there be any similitude or agreement between simple ideas themselves, it cannot
consist in the identity of a third idea that belongs to both; because the ideas are simple; and
if you take any thing that belongs to them, you take all. Therefore no agreement between
simple ideas can be resolved into Identity, unless it be the identity of Relations. But there
seems to be another infallible agreement between simple ideas. Thus some Colours are more
like one to another than others, between which there is yet a very manifest difference. So
between Sounds, Smells, Tastes, and other Sensations. And what is that common agreement
of all these ideas we call colours, whereby we know immediately that that name belongs to
them. Certainly all colours have an agreement one to another, that is quite different from
any agreement that Sounds can have to them. So is there some common agreement to all
Sounds, that Tastes cannot have to any Sound. It cannot be said that the agreement lies only
in this, that these simple ideas come all by the ear; so that their agreement consists only in
their relation they have to that organ. For if it should have been so that we had lived in the
world, and had never found out the way we got these ideas we call Sounds, and never once
thought or considered any thing about it, and should hear some new simple sound, I believe
nobody would question, but that we should immediately perceive an agreement with other
ideas, that used to come by that sense, though we knew not which way one of them came,
and should immediately call it a Sound; and say we had heard a strange Noise. And if we
had never had any such sensation as the Headache, and should have it, I do not think we
should call that a new Sound; for there would be so manifest a disagreement between those
simple ideas, of another kind from what simple ideas have one with another.
I have thought, whether or no the agreement of Colours did not consist, in a Relation
they had to the idea of Space; and whether Colour in general might not be defined, that idea
that filled Space. But I am convinced, that there is another sort of agreement beside that;
and the more, because there can no such common relation be thought of, with respect to
different Sounds. It is probable that this agreement may be resolved into Identity. If we follow
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NO.IV. Remarks in Mental Philosophy. The Mind.