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{"author":null,"canonical_references":[],"date_end":null,"date_start":null,"deduplication_fingerprint":"514b4fa86063d66a19a2e0f1f6d95ce71060a244445624841eb36d43ca0db50c","edition_title":"The City of God, Volume I","edition_translators":["Marcus Dods","George Wilson (Book IV)","J. J. Smith (Books V-VIII)"],"edition_year":1871,"explicit_reference_candidates":[],"headings":["THE WORKS OF AURELIUS AUGUSTINE,","BOOK FIFTH.","ARGUMENT."],"id":"pg45304-paragraph-371","license_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/policy/license.html","note_targets":[],"public_import_allowed":false,"record_kind":"original-paragraph-unclassified","review_required":["work and recension attribution","original-work chronology","Bible reference numbering and citation kind","English edition rights and attribution"],"review_status":"needs_review","rights_evidence":"Provider catalog reports public domain in the USA. Original transcription title leaves state T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh, 1871; printed translator allocation retained. Gutenberg credits Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries without an exact scan identifier. Full provider license preserved with acquired original; republication and per-work metadata remain unreviewed.","source_anchor":null,"source_ebook":45304,"source_html":"<p>Wherefore, neither is that necessity to be feared, for dread\r\nof which the Stoics laboured to make such distinctions among\r\nthe causes of things as should enable them to rescue certain\r\nthings from the dominion of necessity, and to subject others to\r\nit. Among those things which they wished not to be subject\r\nto necessity they placed our wills, knowing that they would\r\nnot be free if subjected to necessity. For if that is to be\r\ncalled <i>our necessity</i> which is not in our power, but even though\r\nwe be unwilling effects what it can effect,—as, for instance, the\r\nnecessity of death,—it is manifest that our wills by which we\r\nlive uprightly or wickedly are not under such a necessity;\r\nfor we do many things which, if we were not willing, we should\r\ncertainly not do. This is primarily true of the act of willing\r\nitself,—for if we will, it <i>is</i>; if we will not, it <i>is</i> not,—for we\r\nshould not will if we were unwilling. But if we define necessity\r\nto be that according to which we say that it is necessary\r\nthat anything be of such or such a nature, or be done in such and\r\nsuch a manner, I know not why we should have any dread of\r\nthat necessity taking away the freedom of our will. For we\r\ndo not put the life of God or the foreknowledge of God under\r\nnecessity if we should say that it is necessary that God should\r\nlive for ever, and foreknow all things; as neither is His power\r\ndiminished when we say that He cannot die or fall into error,—for\r\nthis is in such a way impossible to Him, that if it were\r\npossible for Him, He would be of less power. But assuredly\r\nHe is rightly called omnipotent, though He can neither die\r\nnor fall into error. For He is called omnipotent on account<span class=\"pagenum\"><a id=\"Page_196\">[Pg 196]</a></span>\r\nof His doing what He wills, not on account of His suffering\r\nwhat He wills not; for if that should befall Him, He would by\r\nno means be omnipotent. Wherefore, He cannot do some\r\nthings for the very reason that He is omnipotent. So also,\r\nwhen we say that it is necessary that, when we will, we will\r\nby free choice, in so saying we both affirm what is true beyond\r\ndoubt, and do not still subject our wills thereby to a necessity\r\nwhich destroys liberty. Our wills, therefore, <i>exist</i> as <i>wills</i>, and\r\ndo themselves whatever we do by willing, and which would\r\nnot be done if we were unwilling. But when any one suffers\r\nanything, being unwilling, by the will of another, even in that\r\ncase will retains its essential validity,—we do not mean the\r\nwill of the party who inflicts the suffering, for we resolve it\r\ninto the power of God. For if a will should simply exist, but\r\nnot be able to do what it wills, it would be overborne by a\r\nmore powerful will. Nor would this be the case unless there\r\nhad existed will, and that not the will of the other party, but\r\nthe will of him who willed, but was not able to accomplish\r\nwhat he willed. Therefore, whatsoever a man suffers contrary\r\nto his own will, he ought not to attribute to the will of men,\r\nor of angels, or of any created spirit, but rather to His will\r\nwho gives power to wills. It is not the case, therefore, that\r\nbecause God foreknew what would be in the power of our\r\nwills, there is for that reason nothing in the power of our\r\nwills. For he who foreknew this did not foreknow nothing.\r\nMoreover, if He who foreknew what would be in the power of\r\nour wills did not foreknow nothing, but something, assuredly,\r\neven though He did foreknow, there is something in the power\r\nof our wills. Therefore we are by no means compelled, either,\r\nretaining the prescience of God, to take away the freedom of\r\nthe will, or, retaining the freedom of the will, to deny that He\r\nis prescient of future things, which is impious. But we embrace\r\nboth. We faithfully and sincerely confess both. The\r\nformer, that we may believe well; the latter, that we may live\r\nwell. For he lives ill who does not believe well concerning\r\nGod. Wherefore, be it far from us, in order to maintain our\r\nfreedom, to deny the prescience of Him by whose help we are\r\nor shall be free. Consequently, it is not in vain that laws are\r\nenacted, and that reproaches, exhortations, praises, and vituperations<span class=\"pagenum\"><a id=\"Page_197\">[Pg 197]</a></span>\r\nare had recourse to; for these also He foreknew, and\r\nthey are of great avail, even as great as He foreknew that they\r\nwould be of. Prayers, also, are of avail to procure those things\r\nwhich He foreknew that He would grant to those who offered\r\nthem; and with justice have rewards been appointed for good\r\ndeeds, and punishments for sins. For a man does not therefore\r\nsin because God foreknew that he would sin. Nay, it\r\ncannot be doubted but that it is the man himself who sins\r\nwhen he does sin, because He, whose foreknowledge is infallible,\r\nforeknew not that fate, or fortune, or something else\r\nwould sin, but that the man himself would sin, who, if he\r\nwills not, sins not. But if he shall not will to sin, even this\r\ndid God foreknow.</p>","source_sha256":"d89e9a2b80bb59f394f0fb1bf313b39fab162f06af6642166d62c5912c1195f1","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/45304/pg45304-images.html","text_sha256":"59c80380110b3bed0c96c8a2535ae4734b13491334b59468998a84f27c2386f5","verified":false,"work_id":null}references: [] | work_id: | origin: existing-private-derived-record | source: https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/45304/pg45304-images.html