balance, or even as nothing and vanity; so the arbiter must determine accordingly with respect
to the degree in which God should be regarded, by all intelligent existence, in all actions and
proceedings, determinations and effects whatever, whether creating, preserving, using, dis-
posing, changing, or destroying. And as the Creator is infinite, and has all possible existence,
perfection, and excellence, so he must have all possible regard. As he is every way the first
and supreme, and as his excellency is in all respects the supreme beauty and glory, the ori-
ginal good, and fountain of all good; so he must have in all respects the supreme regard.
And as he is God over all, to whom all are properly subordinate, and on whom all depend,
worthy to reign as supreme Head, with absolute and universal dominion; so it is fit that he
should be so regarded by all, and in all proceedings and effects through the whole system:
The universality of things, in their whole compass and series, should look to him, in such
a manner, as that respect to him should reign over all respect to other things, and regard to
creatures should, universally, be subordinate and subject.
When I speak of regard to be thus adjusted in the universal system, I mean the regard
of the sum total; all intelligent existence, created and uncreated. For it is fit, that the regard
of the Creator should be proportioned to the worthiness of objects, as well as the regard of
creatures. Thus, we must conclude, that such an arbiter as I have supposed, would determine,
that the whole universe, in all its actings, proceedings, revolutions, and entire series of events,
should proceed with a view to God, as the supreme and last end; that every wheel, in all its
rotations, should move with a constant invariable regard to him as the ultimate end of all;
as perfectly and uniformly, as if the whole system were animated and directed by one com-
mon soul. Or, as if such an arbiter as I have before supposed, possessed of perfect wisdom
and rectitude, became the common soul of the universe, and actuated and governed it in
all its motions.
Thus I have gone upon the supposition of a third disinterested person. The thing sup-
posed is impossible; but the case is, nevertheless, just the same, as to what is most fit and
suitable in itself. For it is most certainly proper for God to act, according to the greatest fitness,
and he knows what the greatest fitness is, as much as if perfect rectitude were a distinct
person to direct him. God himself is possessed of that perfect discernment and rectitude
which have been supposed. It belongs to him as supreme arbiter, and to his infinite wisdom
and rectitude, to state all rules and measures of proceedings. And seeing these attributes of
God are infinite, and most absolutely perfect, they are not the less fit to order and dispose,
because they are in him, who is a being concerned, and not a third person that is disinterested.
For being interested unfits a person to be an arbiter or judge, no otherwise, than as interest
tends to mislead his judgment, or incline him to act contrary to it. But that God should be
in danger of either, is contrary to the supposition of his being absolutely perfect. And as
there must be some supreme judge of fitness and propriety in the universality of things, or
otherwise there could be no order, it therefore belongs to God, whose are all things, who is
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SECTION I. The general dictates of reason.