Valentinian. Well, my friend, you seem to me to have argued sufficiently against the
other side. For you appeared to draw right conclusions from the premises which we granted
to the discussion. For truly if matter is without qualities, then God is the maker of qualities;
and if evils are qualities, God will be the author of evils. But it seems to me false to say that
matter is without qualities; for it cannot be said respecting any substance that it is without
qualities. But indeed, in the very act of saying that it is without qualities, you declare that it
has a quality, by describing the character of matter, which is a kind of quality. Therefore, if
you please, begin the discussion from the beginning; for it seems to me that matter never
began to have qualities. For such being the case, I assert, my friend, that evil arises from its
emanation.
Orthodoxus. If matter were possessed of qualities from eternity, of what will God be
the creator? For if we say substances, we speak of them as pre-existing; if, again, we say
qualities, these too are declared to have an existence. Since, then, both substances and
qualities exist, it seems to me superfluous to call God a creator. But answer me a question.
In what way do you say that God was a creator? Was it by changing the existence of those
substances into non-existence, or by changing the qualities while He preserved the sub-
stances?
Valentinian. I think that there was no change of the substances, but only of the qualities;
and in respect to these we call God a creator. And just as if one might chance to say that a
house was made of stones, it cannot be said of them that they do not still continue stones
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in substance, because they are called a house; for I affirm that the house is made by the
quality of construction. So I think that God, while substance remained, produced a change
of its qualities, by reason of which I say that this world was made by God.
Orthodoxus. Do you think, too, that evil is among the qualities of substances?
Valentinian. I do.
Orthodoxus. And were these qualities in matter from the first, or had they a beginning?
Valentinian. I say that these qualities were eternally co-existent with matter.
Orthodoxus. But do you not say that God has made a change in the qualities?
Valentinian. I do say this.
Orthodoxus. For the better?
Valentinian. I think so.
Orthodoxus. If, then, evil is among the qualities of matter, and its qualities were changed
by God for the better, the inquiry must be made whence evil arose. For either all of them,
being evil, underwent a change for the better, or some of them being evil, and some not, the
evil ones were not changed for the better; but the rest, as far as they were found superior,
were changed by God for the sake of order.
Valentinian. That is the opinion I held from the beginning.
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Concerning Free-Will.