SECT. XIII.
Concerning that objection against the reasoning, by which the Calvinistic doctrine is
supposed, that it is metaphysical and abstruse.
It has often been objected against the defenders of Calvinistic principles, that in their
reasonings, they run into nice scholastic distinctions, and abstruse metaphysical subtilties,
and set these in opposition to common sense. And it is possible, that, after the former
manner, it may be alleged against the reasoning by which I have endeavoured to confute
the Arminian scheme of liberty and moral agency, that it is very abstracted and metaphys-
ical. Concerning this, I would observe the following things:
I. If that be made an objection against the foregoing reasoning, that it is metaphysical,
or may properly be reduced to the science of metaphysics, it is a very impertinent objection;
whether it be so or no, is not worthy of any dispute or controversy. If the reasoning be good,
it is as frivolous to inquire what science it is properly reduced to, as what language it is de-
livered in: and for a man to go about to confute the arguments of his opponent, by telling
him, his arguments are metaphysical, would be as weak as to tell him, his arguments could
not be substantial, because they were written in French or Latin. The question is not,
whether what is said be metaphysics, physics, logic, or mathematics, Latin, French, English,
or Mohawk? But whether the reasoning be good, and the arguments truly conclusive? The
foregoing arguments are no more metaphysical, than those which we use against the papists,
to disprove their doctrine of transubstantiation; alleging it is inconsistent with the notion
of corporeal identity, that it should be in ten thousand places at the same time. It is by
metaphysical arguments only we are able to prove, that the rational soul is not corporeal,
that lead or sand cannot think; that thoughts are not square or round, or do not weigh a
pound. The arguments by which we prove the being of God, if handled closely and distinctly,
so as to show their clear and demonstrative evidence, must be metaphysically treated. It is
by metaphysics only that we can demonstrate, that God is not limited to a place, or is not
mutable; that he is not ignorant, or forgetful; that it is impossible for him to lie, or be unjust;
and that there is one God only, and not hundreds or thousands. And, indeed, we have no
strict demonstration of any thing, excepting mathematical truths, but by metaphysics. We
can have no proof, that is properly demonstrative, of any one proposition, relating to the
being and nature of God, his creation of the world, the dependence of all things on him, the
nature of bodies or spirits, the nature of our own souls, or any of the great truths of morality
and natural religion, but what is metaphysical. I am willing my arguments should be brought
to the test of the strictest and justest reason, and that a clear, distinct, and determinate
meaning of the terms I use should be insisted on; but let not the whole be rejected, as if all
were confuted, by fixing on it the epithet, metaphysical.
II. If the reasoning, which has been made use of, be in some sense metaphysical, it will
not follow, that therefore it must need be abstruse, unintelligible, and akin to the jargon of
SECTION XIII. Concerning that objection against the reasoning, by which the Calvinistic doctrine is supposed, that it is metaphysical and abstruse.
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SECTION XIII. Concerning that objection against the reasoning, by which…