254 INSTITUTES OF THE [bOOK II.
before God. But since the sinner, though he endeavours tc
evade the knowledge of good and evil imprinted on his mind,
is frequently brought back to it, and so is not permitted to shut
his eyes, but compelled, whether he will or not, sometimes to
open them, there Js.an tmiii-iuJ:he assertion, that ^r sins nrily
rhypngh ignorniK^f^
XXIII. Themistius, another philosopher, with more truth,
teaches that the human miderstanding is very rarely deceived
in the universal definition, or in the essence of a thing ; but
that it falls into error, Avhen it proceeds further, and descends
to the consideration of particular cases. There is no man,
who, if he be interrogated in a general way, will not affirm
homicide to be criminal ; but he who conspires the death of
his enemy, deliberates on it as a good action. The adulterer
will condemn adultery in general j but will privately flatter
himself in his own. Here lies the ignorance—when a man,
proceeding to a particular case, forgets the rule which he
had just fixed as a general position. This subject is very
excellently treated by Augustine, in his exposition of the first
verse of the fifty-seventh Psalm. The observation of Themis-
tius, however, is not applicable to all cases ; for sometimes the
turpitude of the crime so oppresses the conscience of the sin-
ner, that, no longer imposing on himself under the false image
of virtue, he rushes into evil with the knowledge of his mind
and the consent of his will. This state ofmind produced these
lexpressions, which we find in a heathen poet :
*' I see the bet-
ker path, and approve it ; I pursue the worse." Wherefore the
distinction of Aristotle between incontinence and intemperance
appears to me to be highly judicious. Where incontinence
predominates, he says, that by the perturbation of the affections
or passions, the mind is deprived of particular knowledge, so
that in its own evil actions it observes not that criminality
which it generally discovers in similar actions committed by
other persons ; and that when the perturbation has subsided,
penitence immediately succeeds ; that intemperance is not ex-
tinguished or broken by a sense of sin, but, on the contrary,
obstinately persists in the choice of evil which it has made.
XXIV. Now, when you hear of a universal judgment in
man to discriminate between good and evil, you must not
imagine that it is every wjiere sound and perfect. For if the
hearts of men be furnished with a capacity of discriminating
what is just and unjust, only that they may not excuse them-
selves with the plea of ignorance, it is not at all necessary for
them to discover the truth in every point ; it is quite sufficient
if they understand so much that they can avail themselves of
no subterfuge, but being convicted by the testimony of their
ov^n conscience, even now begin to tremble at the tribunal of