SECT. VII.
Concerning the Necessity of the Divine Will.
Some may, possibly, object against what has been supposed of the absurdity and incon-
sistency of a self-determining power in the Will, and the impossibility of its being otherwise,
than that the Will should be determined in every case by some motive, and by a motive
which (as it stands in the view of the understanding) is of superior strength to any appearing
on the other side; that if these things are true, it will follow, that not only the Will of created
minds, but the Will of God himself, is necessary in all its determinations. Concerning which
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the author of the Essay on the Freedom of Will in God and in the Creature, (page. 85, 86.)
says: “What strange doctrine is this, contrary to all our ideas of the dominion of God? does
it not destroy the glory of his liberty of choice, and take away from the Creator and Governor
and Benefactor of the world, that most free and Sovereign Agent, all the glory of this sort
of freedom? does it not seem to make him a kind of mechanical medium of fate, and introduce
Mr. Hobbes’s doctrine of fatality and Necessity, into all things that God hath to do with!
Does it not seem to represent the blessed God, as a Being of vast understanding, as well as
power, and efficiency, but still to leave him without a Will to choose among all the objects
within his view? In short, it seems to make the blessed God a sort of Almighty Minister of
Fate, under its universal and supreme influence; as it was the professed sentiment of some
of the ancients, that Fate was above the gods.
This is declaiming, rather than arguing; and an application to men’s imaginations and
prejudices, rather than to mere reason. I would now calmly endeavour to consider, whether
there be any reason in this frightful representation. But, before I enter upon a particular
consideration of the matter, I would observe; that it is reasonable to suppose, it should be
much more difficult to express or conceive things according to exact metaphysical truth,
relating to the nature and manner of the existence of things in the Divine Understanding
and Will, and the operation of these faculties (if I may so call them) of the Divine Mind,
than in the human mind; which is infinitely more within our view, more proportionate to
the measure of our comprehension, and more commensurate to the use and import of human
speech. Language is indeed very deficient, in regard of terms to express precise truth con-
cerning our own minds, and their faculties and operations. Words were first formed to ex-
press external things; and those that are applied to express things internal and spiritual, are
almost all borrowed, and used in a sort of figurative sense. Whence they are, most of them,
attended with a great deal of ambiguity and unfixedness in their signification, occasioning
innumerable doubts, difficulties, and confusions, in inquiries and controversies about things
of this nature. But language is much less adapted to express things existing in the mind of
the incomprehensible Deity, precisely as they are.
We find a great deal of difficulty in conceiving exactly of the nature of our own souls.
And notwithstanding all the progress which has been made, in past ages, and the present,
SECTION VII. Concerning the Necessity of the Divine Will.
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SECTION VII. Concerning the Necessity of the Divine Will.