case, we acknowledge one nature with the differences of Person, if, while the Father is believed
in, the Son also is glorified, how can such a Faith be misrepresented by our opponents as
preaching Two First Causes? Then he says, ‘of these two causes, one is lowered’ by us ‘to
the rank of Son.’ Let him point out one champion of such a doctrine; whether he can convict
any single person of talking like this, or only knows of such a doctrine as taught anywhere
at all in the Church, we will hold our peace. For who is so wild in his reasonings, and so
bereft of reflection as, after speaking of Father and Son, to imagine in spite of that two un-
generate beings: and then again to suppose that the One of them has come into being by
means of the Other? Besides, what logical necessity does he show for pushing our teaching
towards such suppositions? By what arguments does he show that such an absurdity must
result from it? If indeed he adduced one single article of our Faith, and then, whether as a
quibble or with a real force of demonstration, made this criticism upon it, there might have
been some reason for his doing so with a view to invalidate that article. But when there is
not, and never can be such a doctrine in the Church, when neither a teacher of it nor a
hearer of it is to be found, and the absurdity cannot be shown, either, to be the strict logical
consequence of anything, I cannot understand the meaning of his fighting thus with shadows.
It is just as if some phenzy-struck person supposed himself to be grappling with an imaginary
combatant, and then, having with great efforts thrown himself down, thought that it was
his foe who was lying there; our clever pamphleteer is in the same state; he feigns suppositions
which we know nothing about, and he fights with the shadows which are sketched by the
workings of his own brain.
For I challenge him to say why a believer in the Son as having come into being from the
Father must advance to the opinion that there are two First Causes; and let him tell us who
is most guilty of this establishment of two First Causes; one who asserts that the Son is falsely
so named, or one who insists that, when we call Him that, the name represents a reality?
The first, rejecting a real generation of the Son, and affirming simply that He exists, would
be more open to the suspicion of making Him a First Cause, if he exists indeed, but not by
generation: whereas the second, making the representative sign of the Person of the Only-
begotten to consist in subsisting generatively from the Father, cannot by any possibility be
drawn into the error of supposing the Son to be Ungenerate. And yet as long as, according
to you thinkers, the non-generation of the Son by the Father is to be held, the Son Himself
will be properly called Ungenerate in one of the many meanings of the Ungenerate; seeing
that, as some things come into existence by being born and others by being fashioned,
nothing prevents our calling one of the latter, which does not subsist by generation, an Un-
generate, looking only to the idea of generation; and this your account, defining, as it does,
our Lord to be a creature, does establish about Him. So, my very learned sirs, it is in your
view, not ours, when it is thus followed out, that the Only-begotten can be named Ungenerate:
153
The Passage where he attacks the μ , and the contention in answer…