be, both good and evil; and temperance, the power that makes the right selection among
these things in their beginnings; and righteousness, which assigns what is just to each; and
that virtue which is the conserver of them all—fortitude. And therefore he did not accustom
us to a mere profession in words, as that prudence, for instance, is the knowledge217 of good
and evil, or of what ought to be done, and what ought not: for that would be indeed a vain
and profitless study, if there was simply the doctrine without the deed; and worthless would
that prudence be, which, without doing the things that ought to be done, and without
turning men away from those that ought not to be done, should be able merely to furnish
the knowledge of these things to those who possessed her,—though many such persons
come under our observation. Nor, again, did he content himself with the mere assertion
that temperance is simply the knowledge of what ought to be chosen and what ought not;
though the other schools of philosophers do not teach even so much as that, and especially
the more recent, who are so forcible and vigorous in words (so that I have often been aston-
ished at them, when they sought to demonstrate that there is the same virtue in God and in
men, and that upon earth, in particular, the wise man is equal218 to God), and yet are incap-
able of delivering the truth as to prudence, so that one shall do the things which are dictated
by prudence, or the truth as to temperance, so that one shall choose the things he has learned
by it; and the same holds good also of their treatment of righteousness and fortitude. Not
thus, however, in mere words only did this teacher go over the truths concerning the virtues
with us; but he incited us much more to the practice of virtue, and stimulated us by the
deeds he did more than by the doctrines he taught.
217 ἐπιστήμη, science.
218 τὰ πρῶτα Θεῷ ἶσον εἶναι τὸν σοφὸν ἄνθρωπον.
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But He Imbues Their Minds, Above All, with Ethical Science; And He Does…