§3.
Fundamental Ideas of
God, the World, and Creation.
The Athanasian idea of God has been singled out
for special recognition in recent times; he has been claimed, and on
the whole with justice, as a witness for the immanence of God in the
universe in contrast to the insistence in many Christian systems on
God’s transcendence or remoteness from all created things.
(Fiske,
Idea of God
, discussed by Moore in
Lux Mundi
(ed.
1) pp. 95–102.) The problem was one which Christian thought was
decisively compelled to face by the Arian controversy (
supra
, p.
xxix.
sq.
). The Apologists and Alexandrians had partially
succeeded in the problem expressed in the dying words of Plotinus,
‘to bring the God which is within into harmony with the God which
is in the universe,’ or rather to reconcile the transcendence
with the immanence of God. But their success was only partial: the
immanence of the Word had been emphasised, but in contrast with the
transcendence of the Father. This could not be more than a temporary
resting-place for the Christian mind, and Arius forced a solution. That
solution was found by Athanasius. The mediatorial work of the Logos is
not necessary as though nature could not bear the untempered hand of
the Father. The Divine Will is the direct and sole source of all
things, and the idea of a
mediatorial nature
is inconsistent
with the true idea of God (pp. 87, 155, 362, comparing carefully p.
383). ‘All things created are capable of sustaining God’s
absolute hand. The hand which fashioned Adam now also and ever is
fashioning and giving entire consistence to those who come after
him.’ The immanence, or intimate presence and unceasing agency of
God in nature, does not belong to the Word as distinct from the Father,
but to the Father in and through the Word, in a word to God as
God
(cf.
de Decr
. 11, where the language of
de
Incarn
. 17 about the Word is applied to God
as such
). This
is a point which marks an advance upon anything that we find in the
earliest writings of Athanasius, and upon the theology of his preceptor
Alexander, to whom, amongst other not very clear formulæ, the Word
is a
μεσιτεύουσα
φύσις
μονογενής
(Thdt.
H. E.
ii. 4; Alexander cannot distinguish
φύσις
from
ὑπόστασις
or
οὐσία
; Father and Son are
δύο
ἀχώριστα
πράγματα
, but yet
τῇ
ὑποστάσει
δύο φύσεις
). This
is indeed the principal particular in which Athanasius left the
modified Origenism of his age, and of his own school, behind. If on the
other hand he resembled Arius in drawing a sharper line than had been
drawn previously between the one God and the World, it must also be
remembered that his God was not the far off purely transcendent God of
Arius, but a God not far from every one of us (
Orat.
ii. p. 361
sq
.).
That God is beyond all essence
ὑπερέκεινα
πάσης
οὐσίας
(
c. Gent
. 2. 2,
40. 2, 35. I
γενητῆς
οὐσίας
) is a thought common to
Origen and the Platonists, but adopted by Athanasius with a difference,
marked by the addition of
γενητῆς
. That God
created all things out of pure bounty of being (
c. Gent.
§2. 2, §41. 2,
de Incarn.
§3. 3, and note there)
is common to Origen and Philo, being taken by the latter from
Plato’s
Timæus
. The Universe, and especially the
human soul, reflects the being of its Author (
c. Gent.
passim).
Hence there are two main paths by which man can arrive at the knowledge
of God, the book of the Universe (
c. Gent.
34
fin
.), and
the contemplation or self-knowledge of the soul itself (
ib.
33,
34). So far Athanasius is on common ground with the Platonists (cf.
Fialon, pp. 270,
sqq.
); but he takes up distinctively Christian
ground, firstly, in emphasising the insufficiency of these proofs after
sin has clouded the soul’s vision, and, above all, in insisting
on the divine Incarnation as the sole remedy for this inability, as the
sole means by which man as he is can reach a true knowledge of God.
Religion not philosophy is the sphere in which the God of Athanasius is
manifest to man.
Here, again,
Athanasius is ‘Christo-centric.’ With Origen, Athanasius
refuses to allow evil any substantive existence (
c. Gent.
§§2, 6,
de Incarn.
§4. 5); evil resides in the
will only, and is the result of the abuse of its power of free choice
(
c. Gent.
5 and 7). The evil in the Universe is mainly the work
of demons, who have aggravated the consequences of human sin also
(
de Incarn.
52. 4). On the other hand, the evil does not extend
beyond the sphere of personal agency, and the Providence of God (upon
which Athanasius insists with remarkable frequency, especially in the
de Fuga
and
c. Gent.
and
de Incarn.,
also in
Vit. Anton.
) exercises untiring care over the whole. The problem
of suffering and death in the animal creation is not discussed by him;
he touches very incidentally,
Orat.
ii. 63, on the deliverance
of creation in connection with
Rom. viii. 19–21
.