Chapter XV.
After assuming that some things were foretold
which are impossible in themselves, and inconsistent with the character
of God, he says: “If these things were predicted of the
Most High God, are we bound to believe them of God simply because they
were predicted?” And thus he thinks he proves, that
although the prophets may have foretold truly such things of the Son of
God, yet it is impossible for us to believe in those prophecies
declaring that He would do or suffer such things. To this our
answer is that the supposition is absurd, for it combines two lines of
reasoning which are opposed to each other, and therefore mutually
destructive. This may be shown as follows. The one argument
is: “If any true prophets of the Most High say that God
will become a slave, or suffer sickness, or die, these things will come
to God; for it is impossible that the prophets of the great God should
utter lies.” The other is: “If even true
prophets of the Most High God say that these same things shall come to
pass, seeing that these things foretold are by the nature of things
impossible, the prophecies are not true, and therefore those things
which have been foretold will not happen to God.” When,
then, we find two processes of reasoning in both of which the major
premiss is the same, leading to two contradictory conclusions, we use
the form of argument called “the theorem of two
propositions,”
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to prove that the
major premiss is false, which in the case before us is this,
“that the prophets have foretold that the great God should become
a slave, suffer sickness, or die.” We conclude, then, that
the prophets never foretold such things; and the argument is formally
expressed as follows: 1st, Of two things, if the first is true,
the second is true; 2d, if the first is
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true, the second is not true, therefore the first is not true.
The concrete example which the Stoics give to illustrate this form of
argument is the following: 1st, If you know that you are dead,
you are dead; 2d, if you know that you are dead, you are not
dead. And the conclusion is—“you do not know
that
you are
dead.” These propositions are worked out as follows:
If you know that you are dead, that which you know is certain;
therefore you are dead. Again, if you know that you are dead,
your death is an object of knowledge; but as the dead know nothing,
your knowing this proves that you are not dead. Accordingly, by
joining the two arguments together, you arrive at the
conclusion—“you do not know that you are dead.”
Now the hypothesis of Celsus which we have given above is much of the
same kind.
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διὰ δύο
τροπικῶν
θεωρήμα
.
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We follow
Bouhéreau and Valesius, who expunge the negative particle in this
clause.