The wish τὸ βουλητόν., then, has reference to the end alone, and not to the means by which the end is attained. The end is the object of our wish, for instance, to be a king or to enjoy good health: but the means by which the end is attained, that is to say, the manner in which we ought to enjoy good health, or reach the rank of king, are the objects of deliberation Max. Dial. cum Pyrrh. et Epist. 1 ad Marin.. Then after wish follow inquiry and speculation (ζήτησις and σκέψις), and after these, if the object is anything within our power, comes counsel or deliberation (βουλή or βούλευσις): counsel is an appetite for investigating lines of action lying within our own power. For one deliberates, whether one ought to prosecute any matter or not, and next, one decides which is the better, and this is called judgment (κρίσις). Thereafter, one becomes disposed to and forms a liking for that in favour of which deliberation gave judgment, and this is called inclination (γνώμη). For should one form a judgment and not be disposed to or form a liking for the object of that judgment, it is not called inclination. Then, again, after one has become so disposed, choice or selection (προαίρεσις and ἐπιλογή) comes into play. For choice consists in the choosing and selecting of one of two possibilities in preference to the other. Then one is impelled to action, and this is called impulse (ὁρμή): and thereafter it is brought into employment, and this is called use (χρῆσις). The last stage after we have enjoyed the use is cessation from desire.