that God should give fallen man an interest in Christ and his merits, as a testimony of his
respect to any thing whatsoever as a loveliness in him; and that because it is not meet, till a
sinner is actually justified, that any thing in him should be accepted of God, as any excellency
or amiableness of his person; or that God, by any act, should in any manner or degree
testify any pleasedness with him, or favour towards him, on the account of any thing inherent
in him: and that for two reasons:
1. The nature of things will not admit of it. And this appears from the infinite guilt that
the sinner till justified is under; which arises from the infinite evil or heinousness of sin. But
because that is what some deny, I would therefore first establish that point, and show that
sin is a thing that is indeed properly of infinite heinousness; and then show the consequence,
that it cannot be suitable, till the sinner is actually justified, that God should by any act
testify pleasedness with or acceptance of any excellency or amiableness of his person.
That the evil and demerit of sin is infinitely great, is most demonstrably evident, because
what the evil or iniquity of sin consists in, is the violating of an obligation, or doing what
we should not do; and therefore by how much the greater the obligation is that is violated,
by so much the greater is the iniquity of the violation. But certainly our obligation to love
or honour any being is great in proportion to the greatness or excellency of that being, or
his worthiness to be loved and honoured. We are under greater obligations to love a more
lovely being than a less lovely; and if a being be infinitely excellent or lovely, our obligations
to love him are therein infinitely great. The matter is so plain, it seems needless to say much
about it.
Some have argued exceeding strangely against the infinite evil of sin, from its being
committed against an infinite object, that then it may as well be argued, that there is also
an infinite value or worthiness in holiness and love to God, because that also has an infinite
object; whereas the argument, from parity of reason, will carry it in the reverse. The sin of
the creature against God is ill deserving in proportion to the distance there is between God
and the creature; the greatness of the object, and the meanness of the subject, aggravates it.
But it is the reverse with regard to the worthiness of the respect of the creature to God; it is
worthless (and not worthy) in proportion to the meanness of the subject. So much the
greater the distance between God and the creature, so much the less is the creature’s respect
worthy of God’s notice or regard. The unworthiness of sin or opposition to God rises and
is great in proportion to the dignity of the object and inferiority of the subject; but on the
contrary, the value of respect rises in proportion to the value of the subject; and that for this
plain reason, viz. that the evil of disrespect is in proportion to the obligation that lies upon
the subject to the object; which obligation is most evidently increased by the excellency and
superiority of the object. But on the contrary, the worthiness of respect to a being is in pro-
portion to the obligation that lies on him who is the object, (or rather the reason he has,)
to regard the subject, which certainly is in proportion to the subject’s value or excellency.
2305
DISCOURSE. I. Justification by Faith alone.