Chapter 6.—What the Cause of the Blessedness of the Good Angels Is, and What the
Cause of the Misery of the Wicked.
Thus the true cause of the blessedness of the good angels is found to be this, that they
cleave to Him who supremely is. And if we ask the cause of the misery of the bad, it occurs
to us, and not unreasonably, that they are miserable because they have forsaken Him who
supremely is, and have turned to themselves who have no such essence. And this vice, what
else is it called than pride? For “pride is the beginning of sin.”530 They were unwilling,
then, to preserve their strength for God; and as adherence to God was the condition of their
enjoying an ampler being, they diminished it by preferring themselves to Him. This was
the first defect, and the first impoverishment, and the first flaw of their nature, which was
created, not indeed supremely existent, but finding its blessedness in the enjoyment of the
Supreme Being; whilst by abandoning Him it should become, not indeed no nature at all,
but a nature with a less ample existence, and therefore wretched.
If the further question be asked, What was the efficient cause of their evil will? there is
none. For what is it which makes the will bad, when it is the will itself which makes the action
bad? And consequently the bad will is the cause of the bad action, but nothing is the efficient
cause of the bad will. For if anything is the cause, this thing either has or has not a will. If
it has, the will is either good or bad. If good, who is so left to himself as to say that a good
will makes a will bad? For in this case a good will would be the cause of sin; a most absurd
supposition. On the other hand, if this hypothetical thing has a bad will, I wish to know
what made it so; and that we may not go on forever, I ask at once, what made the first evil
will bad? For that is not the first which was itself corrupted by an evil will, but that is the
first which was made evil by no other will. For if it were preceded by that which made it
evil, that will was first which made the other evil. But if it is replied, “Nothing made it evil;
it always was evil,” I ask if it has been existing in some nature. For if not, then it did not
exist at all; and if it did exist in some nature, then it vitiated and corrupted it, and injured
it, and consequently deprived it of good. And therefore the evil will could not exist in an
evil nature, but in a nature at once good and mutable, which this vice could injure. For if
it did no injury, it was no vice; and consequently the will in which it was, could not be called
evil. But if it did injury, it did it by taking away or diminishing good. And therefore there
could not be from eternity, as was suggested, an evil will in that thing in which there had
been previously a natural good, which the evil will was able to diminish by corrupting it.
If, then, it was not from eternity, who, I ask, made it? The only thing that can be suggested
in reply is, that something which itself had no will, made the will evil. I ask, then, whether
this thing was superior, inferior, or equal to it? If superior, then it is better. How, then, has
it no will, and not rather a good will? The same reasoning applies if it was equal; for so long
530 Eccles. x. 13.
What the Cause of the Blessedness of the Good Angels Is, and What the Cause of the Misery of the Wicked.
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What the Cause of the Blessedness of the Good Angels Is, and What the Cause…