CHAP. V. CHRISTIAN RELIGION. 3G9
vour to bring odium upon our doctrine, as if it were abhorrent
to common sense, and then they oppose it with certain
passages of Scripture, (infra, sec. 6.) Both devices we shall
dispose of in their order. If sin, say they, is necessary, it
ceases to be sin ; if it is voluntary, it may be avoided. Such,
too, were the weapons with which Pelagius assailed Augustine.
But we are unwilling to crush them by the wreight of his
name, until wTe have satisfactorily disposed of the objections
themselves. I deny, therefore, that sin ought to be the less
imputed because it is necessary ; and, on the other hand, I
deny the inference, that sin may be avoided because it is
voluntary. If any one will dispute with God, and endeavour
to evade his judgment, by pretending that he could not have
done otherwise, the answer already given is sufficient, that it
is owing not to creation, but the corruption of nature, that
man has become the slave of sin, and can will nothing but
evil. For whence that impotence of which the wicked so
readily avail themselves as an excuse, but just because Adam
voluntarily subjected himself to the tyranny of the devil ?
Hence, the corruption by which we are held bound as with
chains, originated in the first man's revolt from his Maker. If all men are justly held guilty of this revolt, let them riot
think themselves excused by a necessity in which they see
the clearest cause of their condemnation. But this I have
fully explained above ; and in the case of the devil himself,
have given an example of one who sins not less voluntarily
that he sins necessarily. I have also shown, in the case of
the elect angels, that though their wiU cannot decline from
good, it does not therefore cease to be will. This Bernard
shrewdly explains when he says, (Serm. 81, in Cantica,) that
we are the more miserable in this, that the necessity is vo
luntary ; and yet this necessity so binds us who are subject
to it, that we are the slaves of sin, as we have already ob
served. The second step in the reasoning is vicious, because
it leaps from voluntary to free; whereas we have proved above,
that a thing may be done voluntarily, though not subject to
free choice.
2. They add, that unless virtue and vice proceed from free
choice, it is absurd either to punish man or reward him.
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