Chapter XXI.
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What, then, is justice? We distinctly remember what in the course of our argument we
said in the commencement of this treatise; namely, that man was fashioned in imitation of
the Divine nature, preserving his resemblance to the Deity as well in other excellences as in
possession of freedom of the will, yet being of necessity of a nature subject to change. For
it was not possible that a being who derived his origin from an alteration should be altogether
free from this liability. For the passing from a state of non-existence into that of existence
is a kind of alteration; when being, that is, by the exercise of Divine power takes the place
of nonentity. In the following special respect, too, alteration is necessarily observable in
man, namely, because man was an imitation of the Divine nature, and unless some distinctive
difference had been occasioned, the imitating subject would be entirely the same as that
which it resembles; but in this instance, it is to be observed, there is a difference between
that which “was made in the image” and its pattern; namely this, that the one is not subject
to change, while the other is (for, as has been described, it has come into existence through
an alteration), and being thus subject to alteration does not always continue in its existing
state. For alteration is a kind of movement ever advancing from the present state to another;
and there are two forms of this movement; the one being ever towards what is good, and in
this the advance has no check, because no goal of the course to be traversed1994 can be
reached, while the other is in the direction of the contrary, and of it this is the essence, that
it has no subsistence; for, as has been before stated, the contrary state to goodness conveys
some such notion of opposition, as when we say, for instance, that that which is is logically
opposed to that which is not, and that existence is so opposed to non-existence. Since, then,
by reason of this impulse and movement of changeful alteration it is not possible that the
nature of the subject of this change should remain self-centred and unmoved, but there is
always something towards which the will is tending, the appetency for moral beauty naturally
drawing it on to movement, this beauty is in one instance really such in its nature, in another
it is not so, only blossoming with an illusive appearance of beauty; and the criterion of these
two kinds is the mind that dwells within us. Under these circumstances it is a matter of risk
whether we happen to choose the real beauty, or whether we are diverted from its choice
by some deception arising from appearance, and thus drift away to the opposite; as happened,
we are told in the heathen fable, to the dog which looked askance at the reflection in the
water of what it carried in its mouth, but let go the real food, and, opening its mouth wide
to swallow the image of it, still hungered. Since, then, the mind has been disappointed in
its craving for the real good, and diverted to that which is not such, being persuaded, through
1994 of the course to be traversed: τοῦ διεξοδευομένου. Glauber remarks that the Latin translation here, “ejus
qui transit,” gives no sense, and rightly takes the word as a passive. Krabinger also translates, “ejus quod
evolvitur.” Here again there is unconscious Platonism: αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν is eternal.
Chapter XXI
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Chapter XXI