tual. The man may be said in some sense to be unable; yea, even as the word unable is a rel-
ative term, and has relation to ineffectual endeavours; yet not with regard to present, but
remote endeavours.
Secondly, It must be borne in mind, according to what was observed before, that indeed
no Inability whatsoever, which is merely moral, is properly called by the name of Inability;
and that in the strictest propriety of speech, a man may be said to have a thing in his power,
if he has it at his election, and he cannot be said to be unable to do a thing, when he can, if
he now pleases, or whenever he has a proper, direct, and immediate desire for it. As to those
desires and endeavours, that may be against the exercises of a strong habit, with regard to
which men may be said to be unable to avoid those exercises, they are remote desires and
endeavours in two respects. First, as to time; they are never against present volitions, but
only against volitions of such a kind, when viewed at a distance. Secondly, as to their nature;
these opposite desires are not directly and properly against the habit and inclination itself,
or the volitions in which it is exercised; for these, in themselves considered, are agreeable:
but against something else that attends them, or is their consequence; the opposition of the
mind is leveled entirely against this; the volitions themselves are not at all opposed directly,
and for their own sake; but only indirectly and remotely, on the account of something foreign.
III. Though the opposition of the Will itself, or the very want of Will to a thing com-
manded, implies a moral Inability to that thing; yet, if it be, as has been already shown, that
the being of a good state or act of Will, is a thing most properly required by Command;
then, in some cases, such a state or act of Will may properly be required, which at present
is not, and which may also be wanting after it is commanded. And therefore those things
may properly be commanded, for which men have a moral Inability.
Such a state or act of the Will, may be required by Command, as does not already exist.
For if that volition only may be commanded to be, which already is, there could be no use
of precept: Commands in all cases would be perfectly vain and impertinent. And not only
may such a Will be required, as is wanting before the Command is given, but also such as
may possibly be wanting afterwards; such as the exhibition of the Command may not be
effectual to produce or excite. Otherwise, no such thing as disobedience to a proper and
rightful Command is possible in any case; and there is no case possible, wherein there can
be a faulty disobedience. Which Arminians cannot affirm, consistently with their principle:
for this makes obedience to just and proper Commands always necessary, and disobedience
impossible. And so the Arminian would overthrow himself, yielding the very point we are
upon, which he so strenuously denies, viz. that Law and Command are consistent with ne-
cessity.
If merely that inability will excuse disobedience, which is implied in the opposition or
defect of inclination, remaining after the Command is exhibited, then wickedness always
carries that in it which excuses it. By how much the more wickedness there is in a man’s
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SECTION IV. Command and Obligation of Obedience, consistent with moral…