against us. “For we call the God of the universe imperishable and ungenerate,” says the
Master, “using these words with different applications.” “His transcending,” he continues,
“every limit of the ages, and every distance in temporal extension, whether we consider the
previous or the subsequent, this absence of limit or circumscription on either hand in the
Eternal Life we mark in the one case with the name of imperishability, and in the other case
with the name of ungeneracy.” But Eunomius would make out that we say that the being
without beginning is His essence, and again that the being without end is His essence, as
though we brought forward two contradictory segments of essence; and in this way he es-
tablishes an absurdity, and while laying down, and then fighting against, positions of his
own, and reducing notions of his own concoction to an absurdity, he lays no hold on our
argument in any single point. For that God is imperishable only wherein His Life is unending,
is his statement, not ours. In like manner, that the imperishable is not without beginning,
is an invention of that same subtle cleverness which would constitute a negative attribute
an essence; whereas we do not define any such negative attribute as an essence. Now it is a
negative attribute of God, that neither does the Life cease in dissolution, nor did It have a
commencement in generation; and this we express by these two words, imperishability and
ungeneracy. But Eunomius, mixing up his own folly with our teaching, does not seem to
understand that he is publishing his own disgrace by his calumnious accusations. For, in
defining ungeneracy as an essence, he will logically arrive at the same pitch of absurdity
which he ascribes to our teaching. For as beginning means1197 one thing, and end means
another, by virtue of an intervening extension, if any one allow the privation of the first of
these to be essence, he must suppose His Life to be only half subsisting in this being without
beginning, and not to extend further, by virtue of His nature, to the being without end, if
ungeneracy be regarded as itself His nature. But if any one insist that both are essence, then,
according to the definition put forward by Eunomius, each of these terms must necessarily,
by virtue of its inherent meaning, be counted as essence, being just as much as, and no more
than, is indicated by the meaning of the term; and thus the argument of Eunomius will not
be without force, inasmuch as that which is without beginning does not involve the notion
of being without end, and vice versa, since according to his account each of the things
mentioned is an essence, and there is no confusion between the two in their relation to each
other, the notion of beginning being different to that of ending, while the words which express
privation of these also differ in their significations.
But that he himself also may be brought to the knowledge of his own trifling, we will
convict him from his own statements. For in the course of his argument he says that God,
in that He is without end, is ungenerate, and that, in that He is ungenerate, He is without
1197 The Latin is wrong here, “secundum rerum intellectarum distinctricem significationem;” for νοουμένων
without the article must be the gen. absol. Besides this the mss. read παράτασιν (not παράστασιν).
568
Answer to Eunomius' Second Book.