Being to be ‘single’ and homogenous, let him grant that it is bound up with this universal
attribute of simplicity and infinitude. If, on the other hand, he divides and estranges the
‘Beings’ from each other, conceiving that of the Only-begotten as another than the Father’s,
and that of the Spirit as another than the Only-begotten, with a ‘more’ and ‘less’ in each
case, let him be exposed now as granting simplicity in appearance only to the Deity, but in
reality proving the composite in Him.
But let us resume the examination of his words in order. “Each Being has in fact and
conception a nature unmixed, single, and absolutely one, as estimated by its dignity.” Why
“as estimated by its dignity?” If he contemplates the Beings in their common dignity, this
addition is unnecessary and superfluous, and dwells upon that which is obvious: although
a word so out of place might be pardoned, if it was any feeling of reverence which prompted
him not to reject it. But here the mischief really is not owing to a mistake about a phrase
(that might be easily set right): but it is connected with his evil designs. He says that each
of the three beings is ‘single, as estimated by its dignity,’ in order that, on the strength of his
previous definitions of the first, second, and third Being, the idea of their simplicity also
may be marred. Having affirmed that the being of the Father alone is ‘Supreme’ and ‘Proper,’
and having refused both these titles to that of the Son and of the Spirit, in accordance with
this, when he comes to speak of them all as ‘simple,’ he thinks it his duty to associate with
them the idea of simplicity in proportion only to their essential worth, so that the Supreme
alone is to be conceived of as at the height and perfection of simplicity, while the second,
in proportion to its declension from supremacy, receives also a diminished measure of
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simplicity, and in the case of the third Being also, there is as much variation from the perfect
simplicity, as the amount of worth is lessened in the extremes: whence it results that the
Father’s being is conceived as of pure simplicity, that of the Son as not so flawless in simpli-
city, but with a mixture of the composite, that of the Holy Spirit as still increasing in the
composite, while the amount of simplicity is gradually lessened. Just as imperfect goodness
must be owned to share in some measure in the reverse disposition, so imperfect simplicity
cannot escape being considered composite.
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His acknowledgment that the Divine Being is 'single' is only verbal.