ye enter not into temptation.” So that whatever difficulty there can be in this matter, it can
be no objection against any principles which have been maintained in opposition to the
principles of Arminians; nor does it any more concern me to remove the difficulty, than it
does them, or indeed all, that call themselves Christians, and acknowledge the divine authority
of the Scriptures.—Nevertheless, this matter may possibly (God allowing) be more particularly
and largely considered, in some future discourse on the doctrine of predestination. 156
But I would here observe, that however the defenders of that notion of liberty which I
have opposed, exclaim against the doctrine of Calvinists, as lending to bring men into doubts
concerning the moral perfections of God; it is their scheme, and not the scheme of Calvinists,
that indeed is justly chargeable with this. For it is one of their most fundamental points,
that a freedom of Will consisting in self-determination, without all necessity, is essential to
moral agency. This is the same thing as to say, that such a determination of the Will, without
all necessity, must be in all intelligent beings, in those things wherein they are moral agents,
or in their moral acts: and from this it will follow, that God’s Will is not necessarily determ-
ined, in any thing he does, as a moral agent, or in any of his acts that are of a moral nature:
So that in all things, wherein he acts holily, justly, and truly, he does not act necessarily; or
his Will is not necessarily determined to act holily and justly; because, if it were necessarily
determined, he would not be a moral agent in thus acting: his Will would be attended with
necessity; which, they say, is inconsistent with moral agency: “He can act no otherwise; he
is at no liberty in the affair; he is determined by unavoidable, invincible necessity: therefore
such agency is no moral agency; yea, no agency at all, properly speaking: a necessary agent
is no agent: he being passive, and subject to necessity, what he does is no act of his, but an
effect of a necessity prior to any act of his.” This is agreeable to their manner of arguing.
Now then, what is become of all our proof of the moral perfections of God? How can we
prove, that God certainly will, in any one instance, do that which is just and holy; seeing his
“Will is determined in the matter by no necessity We have no other way of proving that any
thing certainly will be, but only by the necessity of the event. Where we can see no necessity,
but that the thing may be, or may not be, there we are unavoidably left at a loss. We have
no other way properly and truly to demonstrate the moral perfections of God, but the way
that Mr. Chubb proves them, (p. 252, 261-263. of his Tracts,) viz. that God must, necessarily,
perfectly know what is most worthy and valuable in itself, which, in the nature of things, is
best and fittest to be done. And, as this is most eligible in itself, he, being omniscient, must
see it to be so; and being both omniscient and self-sufficient, cannot have any temptation
to reject it; and so must necessarily will that which is best. And thus, by this necessity of the
156 It does not appear that the author did any thing more, towards accomplishing this design, than to pen
some thoughts, probably with a view to an elaborate treatise, which are included in his Miscellaneous Remarks
and Observations.—W.
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SECTION XI. Of a supposed Inconsistence between these principles and God's…