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four things Varro eliminates three—pleasure, repose, pleasure and repose combined—not
because he thinks these are not worthy of the place assigned them, but because they are in-
cluded in the primary objects of nature. And what need is there, at any rate, to make a
threefold division out of these two ends, pleasure and repose, taking them first severally and
then conjunctly, since both they, and many other things besides, are comprehended in the
primary objects of nature? Which of the three remaining sects must be chosen? This is the
question that Varro dwells upon. For whether one of these three or some other be chosen,
reason forbids that more than one be true. This we shall afterwards see; but meanwhile let
us explain as briefly and distinctly as we can how Varro makes his selection from these three,
that is, from the sects which severally hold that the primary objects of nature are to be desired
for virtue’s sake, that virtue is to be desired for their sake, and that virtue and these objects
are to be desired each for their own sake.
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How Varro, by Removing All the Differences Which Do Not Form Sects, But…