most certainly true, and that to a great degree. It is fact, that they, and not we, have confoun-
ded things with metaphysical, unintelligible notions and phrases, and have drawn them
from the light of plain truth, into the gross darkness of abstruse metaphysical propositions,
and words without a meaning. Their pretended demonstrations depend very much on such
unintelligible, metaphysical phrases, as self-determination, and sovereignty of the Will; and
the metaphysical sense they put on such terms, as necessity, contingency, action, agency,
&c. quite diverse from their meaning as used in common speech; and which, as they use
them, are without any consistent meaning, or any manner of distinct consistent ideas; as
far from it as any of the abstruse terms and perplexed phrases of the peripatetic philosophers,
or the most unintelligible jargon of the schools, or the cant of the wildest fanatics. Yea, we
may be bold to say, these metaphysical terms, on which they build so much, are what they
use without knowing what they mean themselves; they are pure metaphysical sounds, without
any ideas whatsoever in their minds to answer them; inasmuch as it has been demonstrated,
that there cannot be any notion in the mind consistent with these expressions, as they pretend
to explain them; because their explanations destroy themselves. No such notions as imply
self-contradiction, and self-abolition, and this a great many ways, can subsist in the mind;
as there can be no idea of a whole which is less than any of its parts, or of solid extension
without dimensions, or of an effect which is before its cause.—Arminians improve these
terms, as terms of art, and in their metaphysical meaning, to advance and establish those
things which are contrary to common sense, in a high degree. Thus, instead of the plain
vulgar notion of liberty, which all mankind, in every part of the face of the earth and in all
ages, have, consisting in opportunity to do as one pleases; they have introduced a new strange
liberty, consisting in indifference, contingence, and self-determination; by which they involve
themselves and others in great obscurity, and manifold gross inconsistence. So, instead of
placing virtue and vice, as common sense places them very much, in fixed bias and inclina-
tion, and greater virtue and vice in stronger and more established inclination; these, through
their refinings and abstruse notions, suppose a liberty consisting in indifference to be essential
to all virtue and vice. So they have reasoned themselves, not by metaphysical distinctions,
but metaphysical confusion, into many principles about moral agency, blame, praise, reward,
and punishment, which are, as has been shown, exceeding contrary to the common sense
of mankind; and perhaps to their own sense, which governs them in common life.
759
SECTION XIII. Concerning that objection against the reasoning, by which…