I. It appears from the consideration of man’s sinfulness. And that whether we consider
the infinitely evil nature of all sin, or how much sin men are guilty of.
1. If we consider the infinite evil and heinousness of sin in general, it is not unjust in
God to inflict what punishment is deserved; because the very notion of deserving any pun-
ishment is, that it may be justly inflicted. A deserved punishment and a just punishment
are the same thing. To say that one deserves such a punishment, and yet to say that he does
not justly deserve it, is a contradiction; and if he justly deserves it, then it may be justly in-
flicted.
Every crime or fault deserves a greater or less punishment, in proportion as the crime
itself is greater or less. If any fault deserves punishment, then so much the greater the fault,
so much the greater is the punishment deserved. The faulty nature of any thing is the
formal ground and reason of its desert of punishment; and therefore the more any thing
hath of this nature, the more punishment it deserves. And therefore the terribleness of the
degree of punishment, let it be never so terrible, is no argument against the justice of it, if
the proportion does but hold between the heinousness of the crime and the dreadfulness of
the punishment; so that if there be any such thing as a fault infinitely heinous, it will follow
that it is just to inflict a punishment for it that is infinitely dreadful.
A crime is more or less heinous, according as we are under greater or less obligations
to the contrary. This is self-evident; because it is herein that the criminalness or faultiness
of any thing consists, that it is contrary to what we are obliged or bound to, or what ought
to be in us. So the faultiness of one being hating another, is in proportion to his obligation
to love him. The crime of one being despising and casting contempt on another, is propor-
tionably more or less heinous, as he was under greater or less obligations to honour him.
The fault of disobeying another, is greater or less, as any one is under greater or less obliga-
tions to obey him. And therefore if there be any being that we are under infinite obligations
to love, and honour, and obey, the contrary towards him must be infinitely faulty.
Our obligation to love, honour, and obey any being, is in proportion to his loveliness,
honourableness, and authority; for that is the very meaning of the words. When we say any
one is very lovely, it is the same as to say, that he is one very much to be loved. Or if we say
such a one is more honourable than another, the meaning of the words is, that he is one
that we are more obliged to honour. If we say any one has great authority over us, it is the
same as to say, that he has great right to our subjection and obedience.
But God is a being infinitely lovely, because he hath infinite excellency and beauty. To
have infinite excellency and beauty, is the same thing as to have infinite loveliness. He is a
being of infinite greatness, majesty, and glory; and therefore he is infinitely honourable. He
is infinitely exalted above the greatest potentates of the earth, and highest angels in heaven;
and therefore he is infinitely more honourable than they. His authority over us is infinite;
and the ground of his right to our obedience is infinitely strong; for he is infinitely worthy
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DISCOURSE. IV. The Justice of God in the Damnation of Sinners.