should suppose any such notion, it would many ways destroy itself. But it is impossible any
idea or notion should subsist in the mind, whose very nature and essence which constitutes
it, destroys it.—If some learned philosopher, who had been abroad, in giving an account of
the curious observations he had made in his travels, should say, “He had been in Terra del
Fuego, and there had seen an animal, which he calls by a certain name, that begat and brought
forth itself, and yet had a sire and dam distinct from itself; that it had an appetite, and was
hungry before it had a being; that his master, who led him, and governed him at his pleasure,
was always governed by him, and driven by him where he pleased; that when he moved, he
always took a step before the first step; that he went with his head first, and yet always went
tail foremost; and this, though he had neither head nor tail:” it would be no impudence at
all, to tell such a traveler, though a learned man, that he himself had no notion or idea of
such an animal as he gave an account of, and never had, nor ever would have.
As the forementioned notion of Action is very inconsistent, so it is wholly diverse from
the original meaning of the word. The more usual signification of it, in vulgar speech, seems
to be some motion or exertion of power, that is voluntary, or that is the effect of the Will; and
is used in the same sense as doing: and most commonly it is used to signify outward Actions.
So thinking is often distinguished from acting, and desiring and willing from doing.
Besides this more usual and proper signification of the word Action, there are other
ways in which the word is used, that are less proper, which yet have place in common speech.
Oftentimes it is used to signify some motion or alteration in inanimate things, with relation
to some object and effect. So the spring of a watch is said to act upon the chain and wheels;
the sunbeams, to act upon plants and trees: and the fire, to act upon wood. Sometimes, the
word is useful to signify motions, alterations, and exertions of power, which are seen in
corporeal things, considered absolutely; especially when these motions seem to arise from
some internal cause which is hidden; so that they have a greater resemblance of those motions
of our bodies, which are the effects of natural volition, or invisible exertions of Will. So the
fermentation of liquor, the operations of the loadstone, and of electrical bodies, are called
the Action of these things. And sometimes the word Action is used to signify the exercise of
thought, or of Will and inclination: so meditating, loving, hating, inclining, disinclining,
choosing, and refusing, may be sometimes called acting; though more rarely (unless it be
by philosophers and metaphysicians) than in any of the other senses.
But the word is never used in vulgar speech for the self-determinate exercise of the Will,
or an exertion of the soul that arises without any necessary connexion with any thing fore-
going. If a man does something voluntarily, or as the effect of his choice, then in the most
proper sense, and as the word is most originally and commonly used, he is said to act; but
whether that choice or volition be self-determined, or no; whether it be connected with
foregoing, habitual bias; whether it be the certain effect of the strongest motive, or some
intrinsic cause, never comes into consideration in the meaning of the word.
686
SECTION II. The Falseness and Inconsistence of that metaphysical notion…