of the Son, and approach that intervening duration which the mere fancy of these dogmatists
supposes between the Father and the Son, and then reach that other and supreme point of
time by which they close that duration, there we find the life of the Father fixed as it were
upon an apex; and thence we must necessarily conclude that before it the Father is not to
be believed to have existed always.
If you still feel difficulties about this, let us again take an illustration. It shall be that of
two rulers, one shorter than the other. If we fit the bases of the two together we know from
the tops the extra length of the one; from the end of the lesser lying alongside of it we
measure this excess, supplementing the deficiency of the shorter ruler by a calculation, and
so bringing it up to the end of the longer; a cubit for instance, or whatever be the distance
of the one end from the other. So, if there is, as our adversaries say, an excess of some kind
in the Father’s life as compared with the Son’s, it must needs consist in some definite interval
of duration: and they will allow that this interval of excess cannot be in the future, for that
Both are imperishable, even the foes of the truth will grant. No; they conceive of this differ-
ence as in the past, and instead of equalizing the life of the Father and the Son there, they
extend the conception of the Father by an interval of living. But every interval must be
bounded by two ends: and so for this interval which they have devised we must grasp the
two points by which the ends are denoted. The one portion takes its beginning, in their
view, from the Son’s generation; and the other portion must end in some other point, from
which the interval starts, and by which it limits itself. What this is, is for them to tell us;
unless, indeed, they are ashamed of the consequences of their own assumptions.
It admits not of a doubt, then, that they will not be able to find at all the other portion,
corresponding to the first portion of their fancied interval, except they were to suppose
some beginning of their Ungenerate, whence the middle, that connects with the generation
of the Son, may be conceived of as starting. We affirm, then, that when he makes the Son
later than the Father by a certain intervening extension of life, he must grant a fixed beginning
to the Father’s existence also, regulated by this same interval of his devising; and thus their
much-vaunted “Ungeneracy” of the Father will be found to be undermined by its own
champions’ arguments; and they will have to confess that their Ungenerate God did once
not exist, but began from a starting-point: indeed, that which has a beginning of being is
not inoriginate. But if we must at all risks confess this absence of beginning in the Father,
let not such exactitude be displayed in fixing for the life of the Son a point which, as the
term of His existence, must cut Him off from the life on the other side of it; let it suffice on
the ground of causation only to conceive of the Father as before the Son; and let not the
Father’s life be thought of as a separate and peculiar one before the generation of the Son,
lest we should have to admit the idea inevitably associated with this of an interval before
the appearance of the Son which measures the life of Him Who begot Him, and then the
necessary consequence of this, that a beginning of the Father’s life also must be supposed
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He who asserts that the Father is 'prior' to the Son with any thought of…